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Abstract
In this article, I provide a comparative historical account on the debate of whether corporations
should exclusively be run by the company in the interest of shareholders, or whether managers
should be permitted or required to take the interests of others groups (stake-holders) into account.
The comparison focuses on the US, Germany and France and traces the debates through the most
important formative periods of these countries’ corporate governance systems.
It is generally assumed that shareholder primacy has a stronger following in the US and the UK than
in Continental Europe, where the stakeholder view is thought to be more inﬂuential. Without doubt,
the respective political histories and cultures of these countries have inﬂuenced this divergence.
Without ignoring the signiﬁcance of these factors, this article emphasizes a core issue that has so
far been largely overlooked in comparative analysis. I argue that the respective historical debates
exhibited important differences that can be attributed to the shareholder-manager balance of powers
and differences in stock ownership structure across countries. Scholars in the US, Germany and
France were therefore arguing about different issues due to different economic circumstances,
which is why it is problematic to equate adherents of shareholder primacy or a stakeholder view of
the ﬁrm with their counterparts in other corporate governance systems.
In the US, Berle and Means famously identiﬁed the prevalence of a strong separation of ownership
and control in 1933. US-style dispersed ownership has always generated debates about the question
of how to best address what is today described as an agency cost problem, but also to what extent
managerial power is legitimate.
By contrast, larger blocks of share ownership prevailed around 1930 in Continental Europe, as
they still do today. Participants in the German and French debates were therefore concerned
with issues of controlled companies and corporate groups, which undermined the power of the
board of directors. At the same time, the comparatively strong inﬂuence of shareholders raised
other concerns that were rarely an issue in large US corporations, such as blockholders’ private
beneﬁts of control and conﬂicts between competing groups of shareholders that arguably harmed
business development. Institutional theories of the corporation, which are traditionally hospitable
to stakeholder concerns, seemed to provide a defense of the corporation against its shareholders.
The different nature of the main issues put pro-management and pro-shareholder on different
sides of the shareholder-stakeholder debate on the two sides of the Atlantic. In the US, reformers
typically had the goal of limiting the power of management to the beneﬁt of shareholders, thereby
“taming” the large corporations, whose power was (and is) often identiﬁed with that of top
management. In France and Germany, critics of the prevailing allocation of control advocated an
institutional theory of the corporation to protect the “business in itself” in Continental Europe, and
by proxy, its stakeholders from destructive shareholder inﬂuence. Continental critics of the status
quo therefore sought to limit allegedly excessive inﬂuence of shareholders and capital on corporate
management.
Keywords: shareholder primacy, stakeholders, corporate theory, theory of the firm,
Rathenau, Unternehmen an sich, interet social, codetermination
JEL Classifications: J53, K22, L22, N12, N14, P16, P52

Martin Gelter
Fordham University School of Law
140 West 62nd Street
New York, NY 10023
United States
phone: 646-312-8752
e-mail: mgelter@law.fordham.edu

Fordham University
School of Law

August 2010
“Taming or Protecting the Modern Corporation?
Shareholder - Stakeholder Debates in a Comparative Light”
By
MARTIN GELTER
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF LAW
WORKING PAPER SERIES
This paper can be downloaded without charge
from the Social Science Research Network electronic library:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1669444

MARTIN GELTER

8/19/2010

Table of Contents
1.
Introduction ................................................................................4
2.
What’s at stake? The underlying conflicts of interest ..............11
2.1. Powerless American shareholders?..........................................11
2.2. The current trend towards shareholder empowerment.............16
2.3. Objections to shareholder empowerment.................................19
2.4. Vehicles of the debate: How do “legal” theories about the
nature of the corporation matter? .......................................................25
3.
Preeminent managerial power: contextualizing the historical
US debate ...........................................................................................29
3.1. Berle, Dodd, and dispersed ownership ....................................29
3.2. The irrelevance of corporate jurisprudence .............................34
3.3. How the US differs from Germany and France .......................38
4.
German block ownership and the theory of the “Unternehmen
an sich“ ..............................................................................................40
4.1. In the realm of majority shareholders ......................................41
4.2. The dark origins of German institutionalism ...........................42
4.3. Post-War reception...................................................................57
4.4. An unusual practical application: The Mannesmann case .......62
4.5. Conclusion: Institutionalism as an attempt to constrain
shareholder power ..............................................................................66
5.
French institutionalism and the “intérêt social” ......................67
5.1. The origins of the French institutional school .........................68
5.2. Institutionalism, the law, and the courts ..................................72
5.3. Dismissal ad nutum ..................................................................80
5.4. Conclusion: Another attempt to constrain shareholders through
institutionalism ...................................................................................81
6.
Emerging comparative patterns ...............................................81
6.1. A transnational history of the debate .......................................82
6.2. Defending the firm against its shareholders.............................85
6.3. Does the theory predict more recent developments .................87
7.
Conclusion ...............................................................................93

3

TAMING OR PROTECTING THE MODERN CORPORATION?

8/19/2010

“In the last seven deals that I've been involved with, there were 2.5 million
stockholders who have made a pretax profit of 12 billion dollars. … The point is,
ladies and gentleman, that greed, for lack of a better word, is good.”
-

Gordon Gekko in “Wall Street”1

“It is infidelity of the lord to the vassal for Siemens to ax 12000 jobs, while
at the same time broadcasting a 20% increase in profits.”
-

1.

Rolf Hochhuth, “McKinsey is coming”2

Introduction

What is, and what should the ultimate purpose of the corporation be? What goals should directors by required or permitted to pursue? While there is widespread agreement that ultimately “corporate
enterprise should be organized and operated to serve the interests of
society as a whole”,3 there are two opposing philosophies how this
objective can best be advanced. The majority of US corporate law
scholars today would probably side with Gordon Gekko, the fictional
1980s takeover artist who, like his real-life counterparts, broke up
firms to make money for shareholders. Milton Friedman, in a 1970s
essay, provided a succinct summary by stating that “[t]he Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits."4 According to the
contemporary standard explanation, the maximization of long-term
shareholder value should indeed be the goal of corporate law, whereas the protection of the interests of other stakeholders such as employees, suppliers, costumers, local communities etc. should be left to
1

WALL STREET (20th Century Fox 1987).
“Untreue des Herrn gegen den Knecht ist, wenn Siemens 12 000 Stellen abbaut,
doch zugleich eine Gewinnsteigerung um 20 Prozent ausposaunt!” (own translation). ROLF HOCHHUT, MCKINSEY KOMMT. MOLIÈRES TARTUFFE 76 (4th ed. 2004).
3
E.g. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate
Law, 89 GEO. L. J. 438, 441 (2001).
4
Milton Friedman, The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits,
NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY MAGAZINE, Sept. 13, 1970, at 17.
2
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contracts, or other fields of law, given that shareholders are residual
claimants.5
The quotation from Rolf Hochhuth’s controversial 2004 play
casts the social role of the corporation in an entirely different light:
Like the medieval feudal lord, who was expected to protect his vassals, the corporation owes a responsibility to protect its employees
and to provide them with benefits and a secure livelihood. The broader issue is that the goal of corporate activity should be to increase the
welfare of all groups that closely interact with the firm and have an
interest in its continuous well-being (its so-called “stakeholders”).
The German origin of the quotation betrays that this philosophy is
understood to enjoy a much larger following in Continental Europe
than in the more market-oriented economies of the US and the UK.6
Nevertheless, this question has stirred debate among scholars
and practitioners in much of the developed world. The participants of
such debates sometimes knew about debates in other countries. In the
US, Adolph Berle engaged in a famous exchange with Merrick Dodd
that is typically seen as foreshadowing later shareholder-stakeholder
discussions in 1932. Berle must have been aware of at least some
ideas of Walther Rathenau, the forerunner of the German debate, given that he cites Rathenau in his seminal book with Gardiner Means.7
Although these debates have repeatedly been subjected to retrospective analysis by academics and policymakers in the respective countries, a true comparative understanding of the intellectual history of
corporate law has yet to emerge. The objective of this paper is to fill
in part of this gap and suggest a specific theory to explain differences
between the US debate on the one hand, and the German and French
5

Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 449.
E.g. Brian R. Cheffins, The Metamorphosis of “Germany Inc.”: The Case of Executive Pay, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 497, 500-501 (2001); Hansmann & Kraakman,
supra note 3, at 443-449; Amir N. Licht, The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory of Values and Cognitive Style, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 649, 733
(2004); Martin Gelter, The Dark Side of Shareholder Influence: Managerial Autonomy and Stakeholder Orientation in Comparative Corporate Governance, 50
HARV. INT’L L.J. 129, 131 (2009); Christopher M. Bruner, Power and Purpose in
the “Anglo-American” Corporation, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 579, 581 (2010).
7
ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 352 (1933).
6
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debates on the other. The truth that the conventional wisdom of Continental Europe is more stakeholder-oriented is debatable, despite
frequently cited examples such as German codetermination.8 However, the intellectual history seems to support a greater focus on shareholder welfare in the US: Shareholder primacy seems to have had a
larger following.
One explanation could be that (Continental) Europeans are
more socialistic than Americans.9 Indeed, it is often thought that
stakeholder theories were popular among those who sought government intervention in the economy. However, this is not an entirely
satisfactory explanation: The US has had its fair share of political
populism that was often directed against powerful players in corporate governance.10
The “varieties of capitalism” school of economic sociology
provides the basis for another hypothesis. This literature distinguishes
between liberal and coordinated market economies, with liberal ones
relying primarily on markets and hierarchies to organize economic
activity, and coordinated ones relying on long-term relationships.11 A
stakeholder view of corporate law and a corresponding duty of directors could be seen as an instrument of protecting long-term relationships.12 While the respective national manifestations of the debate
were certainly influenced by cultural and economic circumstances in
8

E.g. Klaus J. Hopt, Labor Representation on Corporate Boards: Impact and Problems for Corporate Governance and Economic Integration in Europe, 14 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 203, 208-209 (1994).
9
Cf. Marco Becht & J. Bradford DeLong, Why Has There Been so Little Block
Holding in America? in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE
WORLD 613, 613 (Randall K. Morck ed. 2005) (citing German economist Werner
Sombart about why the US had no socialism 100 years ago); MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2003) (explaining the persistence of block ownership in Europe with the presence of strong political pro-labor
pressure).
10
MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS – WEAK OWNERS 51-124 (1994).
11
Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism, in
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM 1, 8-9 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds. 2001).
12
Katharina Pistor, Legal Ground Rules in Coordinated and Liberal Market Economies, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CONTEXT 249, 259, 269-270 (Klaus J. Hopt,
Eddy Wymeersch, Hideki Kanda & Harald Baum eds. 2005).
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general, the explanation proposed in this article relates to this argument, but differs in an important respect. I argue that cross-country
differences in corporate ownership structure, played a decisive role
for why movements against the prevailing powers in corporate governance took different shapes, given the impact that the existence of
large ownership blocks have on the relationship between different
groups of shareholders, and between shareholders and stakeholders.
In the US, “stakeholder” arguments and institutional theories
of the corporation tended to be brought forward in defense of the status quo, which is characterized by an unusual degree of managerial
power. By contrast, similar theories in France and Germany served as
a possible argument to constrain large firms there, namely large
blockholders, and to prevent them from using their influence in a way
that hurts the firm, minority shareholders, and other stakeholders. In
other words, “pro-stakeholder” arguments stood on two different
sides of the debate: Perhaps critics of prevailing corporate structures
had better reasons to advocate stakeholder protection than their
American counterparts.
Today, the US and the UK are normally thought to be characterized by dispersed ownership, while in most other countries’ economies concentrated ownership persists even in most of the largest
firms.13 While the exact time that dispersed ownership developed is
far from clear14 and the actual prevalence of dispersed ownership is
even disputed by some,15 the study of comparative intellectual history

13

According to the conventional wisdom, the US and the UK have dispersed ownership in most large firms, whereas elsewhere, concentrated ownership prevails.
E.g. Raphael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate
ownership around the world, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999).
14
When the UK developed dispersed ownership is disputed. Most scholars believe
that dispersion occured some time between the 1950s and the 1980s. See e.g. Brian
R. Cheffins, Does Law Matter? The Separation of Ownership and Control in the
United Kingdom, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 459, 466-468 (2001); ROE, supra note 9, at
100; but see Julian Franks, Colin Mayer & Stefano Rossi, Ownership: Evolution
and Regulation (2006), 29 REV. FIN. STUD. 4009 (2009) (arguing that dispersed
ownership was already present in the early 20th century).
15
Clifford G. Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States, 22
REV. FIN. STUD. 1377 (2009) (arguing that, contrary to the conventional wisdom

7

TAMING OR PROTECTING THE MODERN CORPORATION?

8/19/2010

reveals that conventional wisdom about ownership structures influenced shareholder-stakeholder debates. Following the emergence of
the large, “modern corporation” (in the words of Berle and Means16),
scholars and practitioners attempted to make sense of what they observed in practice, and to influence policy. Their respective perception of ownership structure was sometimes an explicit, sometimes an
unspoken premise that shaped the debates and the views expressed
therein.
I further highlight how the shareholder-stakeholder controversy is intimately linked to the balance of powers between management
and directors on the one hand, and shareholders on the other. As a
consequence of perceived corporate governance failures during the
scandals of the early 2000s and the current financial crisis, US corporate law policy finally seems to be moving in the direction advocated
by most academics by increasing shareholder power,17 apparently
undergoing a “seismic shift.”18 This issue takes us back to the old
controversy between proponents of “contractual” and “institutional”
theories about the nature of the corporation. With the foundational
contract between shareholders fading into the background in institutional theories, the latter is more amenable to greater independence
from shareholders, which also allows a stronger role for stakeholders
such as workers.
I argue that the positions of the proponents of either view on
one side of the Atlantic cannot easily be equated with their purported
equivalents on the other side, given that they brought forward arguments against the backdrop of very different economic patterns and
and most other empirical evidence, dispersed ownership is not more prevalent in the
US than elsewhere).
16
BERLE & MEANS, supra note 7.
17
See most prominently, the proposed Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S.
1074 111th Cong. (requiring a mandatory shareholder vote on executive pay and a
greater input of shareholders in board elections), and the proposed SEC Rules Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. 29024-01 (SEC proposed
June 18, 2009) (requiring the inclusion of shareholder nominees in the management
proxy statements).
18
Jennifer G. Hill, The Rising Tension Between Shareholder and Director Power in
the Common Law World, ECGI LAW WORKING PAPER NO. 152/2010, 3 (2010), at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1582258.
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therefore were concerned with different political and economic issues. Since Berle and Means discovered dispersed ownership in the
US in 1932, scholars argued about the strong position of managers, its
consequences, and possible remedies to the problems it caused. A
considerable degree of institutional independence of the corporation
from shareholders was always evident, and the economic and political
power of “big business” seemed to be concentrated in the hands of a
managerial elite. The main concern therefore was whether and how
managers should be constrained. While some hoped to commit them
to shareholder value, others wanted to enlist them as guardians for the
interest of all corporate constituencies. Members of the opposing
camp were more optimistic about managers’ ability and willingness
to consider stakeholder concerns. Even today, the defining characteristic around which all debates revolve is managerial power. “Stakeholder” and “institutional” arguments tend to serve the purposes of
corporate insiders, specifically to defend their entrenched position
from assaults of outside investors and policymakers hoping to hold
them more accountable.
By contrast, participants in the German and French debates
addressed issues of controlled with larger blocks of shares. In the absence of an atomized shareholder structure, the potential for conflict
between competing groups of shareholders became a major concern.
At least according to some, it impeded the creation of welfare by
large corporations, and its ability to serve the public interest. Obviously, conflicts among shareholders are more important when there
are large blocks, particularly when ownership structures became fluid
in an unstable economic environment.
As a consequence of the difference in the relative importance
of these two concerns, the roles of contractual and institutional theories were reversed in the US and the two Continental European countries, with the “reformist” camp ending up on two different sides. In
the US, excessive shareholder influence remained a non-issue. Scholars were (and still are) concerned with excessive managerial power
that was criticized as lacking legitimacy and later as causing large
agency costs. “Institutionalist” or pro-stakeholder arguments tended
to be a defense for managers (unless they were coupled with regulato-

9

TAMING OR PROTECTING THE MODERN CORPORATION?

8/19/2010

ry intervention19), while critics of the current status quo tended to be
the ones emphasizing shareholder interests and assailing the managerial stronghold. Contrariwise, in Germany and France, analysts who
sought to change the status quo by limiting the excessive influence of
the apparently power-wielding group needed to constrain shareholder
influence, and thus advanced theories emphasizing the “institutional”
character of the corporation, which are typically more hospitable to
stakeholder concerns. These were intended to defend the corporation
against the effective controllers of the firm – large shareholders – in
order to limit outside influence that was sometimes detrimental. Institutional theories were suggested to defend corporations against their
shareholders. The “interest of the corporate entity” – a core concept in
Germany and France– was originally intended as a mechanism to
balance conflicting interests and to avoid abuses, although the practical significance has remained limited.
This article proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets the scene by
describing the relevant economic theory and the stakes of the debate,
focusing particularly on US corporate governance and showing why
the historical comparison is important for the current discussion in
shareholder empowerment: Why does the balance of powers between
shareholders and managers matter so much? What effects does it have
on stakeholders, and why does the debate about the institutional or
contractual understanding of the corporation matter? This section also
introduces the historical vehicle of these conflicts of interest, namely
the controversy about the “legal nature” of the corporation. Section 3
briefly describes the historical development of the US debate relating
to the shareholder-stakeholder controversy and seeks to contextualize
it against the backdrop of dispersed ownership. Sections 4 and 5 provide relatively detailed accounts of the historical German and French
debates, emphasizing how the presence of blockholders and intrashareholder conflicts of interest resulted in a different debate. Section
6 puts the pieces of the puzzle together and develops the comparative
theory of this paper. Section 7 concludes.

19

An example would be RALPH NADER,
THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976).

MARK GREEN & JOEL SELIGMAN, TAMING
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2. What’s at stake? The underlying conflicts of interest
This section provides an overview of the US development of
the balance of power between managers and shareholders, both in its
historical dimension and the contemporary discussion; in doing so, it
introduces the underlying conflicts of interest, and explains how managerial power and shareholder-stakeholder issues are connected. US
corporate law seems to be currently undergoing a shift from a system
with shareholders that are powerless vis-à-vis managers (described in
section 2.1) to one where their significance grows (this trend is described in section 2.2). Section 2.3 looks at the arguments against
shareholder empowerment, and section 2.4 introduces the debate between “contractual” and “institutional” theories of the corporation.
Both are important for the comparative study, since more arguments
against shareholder empowerment often resemble historical European
ones.

2.1.

Powerless American shareholders?

Historical discussions of US corporate governance often begin
with Berle and Means. Adolph Berle, a Columbia law professor on
his way to becoming the doyen of American corporate law, and the
young economist Gardiner Means famously identified the “separation
of ownership and control” in their 1932 book:20 Having conducted a
meticulous empirical study21, the two authors found that a large proportion of the publicly traded firms were owned by a large number of
widely dispersed, but powerless shareholders, and de facto controlled
by a managerial oligarchy. Berle and Means’ seminal study became
the fundament on which economists and legal scholars have built
their debates upon until today. Dispersed ownership, which they identified as the predominant structure among large, publicly traded firms,
20

BERLE & MEANS, supra note 7.
Gardiner C. Means, The Diffusion of Stock Ownership in the United States, 44 Q.
J. ECON. 561 (1930); Gardiner C. Means, The Separation of Ownership and Control
in American Industry, 46 Q. J. ECON. 68 (1931).
21
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continues to be seen as a defining characteristic of US-style capitalism.22
Following the Depression, the New Deal and World War II,
the US economy entered a period of growth. American firms developed into large conglomerates that not only extended into various
industries and behemoths of worldwide importance. The internal
structure of these firms, however, remained relatively stable, as they
developed into large bureaucracies governed by managerial elites.23
In that period, top management may have grown even more distant
from any influence of shareholders, who continued to be considered
the owners of the firm by legal doctrine.24
Things changed dramatically around 1980. Triggered by innovations in banking, such as the development of junk bonds and the
proliferation of leveraged buyouts, a wave of hostile takeovers shook
the economy.25 For a while, this new market for corporate control
resulted in many firms being taken over and restructured. Some
praised the qualities of this market for reducing inefficiencies by
aligning managerial interests with those of shareholders, thus reducing agency cost.26 Others were concerned about stakeholders of firms,
22

But see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
E.g. DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM 108-111 (2005); GERALD F. DAVIS, MANAGED BY THE MARKETS 72-77 (2009) (describing managerial dominance
during this period); for contemporary accounts of the “managerial revolution” see
ALFRED DUPONT CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION
IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977); JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL
STATE (1st ed. 1967; 4th ed. 1985; reprint 2006).
24
E.g. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 444 (suggesting that legislative
developments of that period tended to further entrench managers).
25
See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and
Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 884,
873-874 (2002) (providing empirical evidence about the takeover wave); SKEEL,
supra note 23, at 111-116: John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the
Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? The Peculiar Divergence of US and UK
Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO. L. J. 1727, 1755 (2007); DAVIS, supra note 23, at 8187.
26
Henry Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON.
110 (1965); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981); Ronald J.
Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tac23
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such as creditors whose claims declined in value because of junk debt
issues, communities where factories were closed, and employees losing their jobs.27
On one level, the change was only temporary: takeover artists
did not typically retain a controlling stake in the firm, so that ultimately most companies remained management-controlled (even
though the companies emerging from a hostile takeover were often
very different from their predecessors). Managers and lawyers
representing them learned how to defend against hostile takeovers,
and after some years of back and forth in the Delaware courtrooms,
the courts acquiesced to granting directors wide latitude to defend
against hostile takeovers.28
On another level, the American economy was deeply affected.
Observers often attribute a paradigm shift from a “managerial” to a
“shareholder-centric” corporate economy that happened to this period. Following the development of agency theory in corporate
finance,29 the idea that managerial agency cost was the main problem
of corporate law and that managers should work only in the interest of
shareholders gained widespread acceptance.30 The proliferation of
defined contribution pension plans, which essentially made Americans dependent on the stock market, may have been a contributory

tics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981);Michael C. Jensen, Agency Cost
of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323,
327-329 (1986)..
27
Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in
CORPORATE TAKEOVERS. CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33, 37 (ALAN J. AUERBACH
ed. 1988); Morey W. McDaniel, Stockholders and Stakeholders, 21 STETSON L.
REV. 123, 123-126 (1991).
28
Infra note 37-41 and accompanying text.
29
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); see
RAKESH KHURANA, FROM HIGHER AIMS TO HIRED HANDS 317-326 (2007).
30
E.g. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 440-441; (arguing that a shareholder-based corporate governance system replaced a managerial system during that
period); DAVIS, supra note 23, at 87-95; KHURANA, id., at 297-305.
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factor.31 A changing culture in business education and managerial
social norms seems to have been a collateral consequence.32
Nevertheless, managers remained steadfastly in control of
firms, as the hostile takeover market declined in the early 1990s.
However, this was followed by an increase in incentive-based executive compensation, which some have interpreted as an adaptive response by the market to align managers’ incentives with shareholder
interests.33
Despite this apparent shift, Berle and Means’ “separation of
ownership and control” persists. Factual managerial power is bolstered by pro-management legal institutions. The balance of power is
tilted in favor of the board of directors (compared to shareholders) in
a way that is unparalleled in other important corporate jurisdictions.
The board of directors is entrusted with the task of directing the business and affairs of the corporation34 with little influence from shareholders. The process of nominating and reappointing directors, including independent outside board members, is dominated by the incumbents, who have the advantage of using the firms’ resources to
run the proxy machinery to garner votes. The chances for an insurgent
outsider to oust management are dim, and incentives are mitigated by
the uncertainty of being reimbursed.35 Securities law erects further
31

DAVIS, id., at 212-222; Markus Roth, Employee Participation, Corporate Governance and the Firm: A Transatlantic View Focused on Occupational Pensions and
Co-Determination, 11 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 51, 58-59, 68-69 (2010); see EDWARD A. ZELINSKY, THE ORIGINS OF THE OWNERSHIP SOCIETY 101-105 (2007)
(contrasting the prevalence of defined contribution plans in the US with their absence in other major industrial countries).
32
KHURANA, supra 29, at 305-323.
33
Kahan & Rock, supra note 25.
34
DGCL 141(a).
35
The leading case is Rosenfeld v. Fairchield Engine & Airplaine Corp., 128
N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1955) (establishing the “Froessel rule” named after Judge Charles
Froessel). For a more thorough description and a deeper analysis see Lucian Arye
Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Towards
Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1073, 1106-1126 (1990); see also Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 682-683 (2007)
(reporting that the number of contested proxy solicitations per year never exceeded
40 for the period between 1996 and 2004, during which time there were about 300
contested solicitations in total).
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barriers to coordination that might tip the balance of power towards
shareholders.36
The effects of market mechanisms that align the interests of
managers with those of shareholders have long remained limited.
While the US saw a famous wave of hostile takeovers in the 1980s,
these subsequently became rarer as a consequence of Delaware case
law. With the narrowing of the Unocal37 standard in Unitrin38, and
the restriction of Revlon39 duties under the two Paramount40 cases,
managers are essentially able to “just say no” to a hostile bid.41 Studies have found that firms with both a poison pill and a staggered
36

Under § 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act, anyone directly or indirectly acquiring beneficial ownership of 5% of any class of equity security must submit a
13(d) filing with the SEC within 10 days. One important aspect is SEC Rule 13d5(1), under which persons acting together “for the purpose of acquiring, holding,
voting or disposing of equity securities” are deemed a group for purposes of
§ 13(d), and are thus required to submit a 13D filing if they jointly surpass the 5%
threshold. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the Institutional Investor: A HalfTime Report, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 837, 842, 877-882 (1994), and Bernard S. Black,
Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance in the United States, in 3 THE
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 459, 461 (vol. 3, Peter
Newman ed. 1998) (both discussing how this requirement inhibits, if not entirely
prevents coordination among shareholders).
Furthermore, shareholders communicating among each other run the risk of having
to file a proxy statement. Securities Act § 14 and SEC Rule 14a-1(l)(iii) require one
if communication is “reasonably calculated to result in the procurement, withholding or revocation of a proxy.” Rule 14a-8, which allows a proposal to be included in
the company’s proxy statement, is open only to limited subject matters requires
submission six months before the shareholder meeting. See Black, id, at 459; see
also Coffee, id., at 884. Regarding impediments against institutional shareholder
such as banks and insurers see ROE, supra note 10 (showing how banking regulation
and other laws prevented institutional investors from taking a greater role in US
corporate governance).
37
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A. 3d 946 (Del. 1985).
38
Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
39
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (1986).
40
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (1989);
Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 47 (Del.
1993).
41
E.g. Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Just Say Never”: Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and
Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffet, 19 CARDOZO L. REV.
511, 516 (1997).
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board that is entrenched in the corporate charter are essentially takeover-proof.42 Executive compensation was intended to align financial
managerial interest with shareholders’43 and was sometimes even
described as an adaptive response making up for the absence of proshareholder incentives resulting from takeover defenses.44 However,
there is mounting criticism that it primarily serves as a rent-creational
device for management.45

2.2.

The current trend towards shareholder empowerment

Finance theorists and scholars of corporate law have often lamented this state of affairs and sought to make management more
attentive to the needs of shareholders. The debate has intensified in
recent years due to the financial crisis, and to some extent the efforts
of shareholder rights advocates are now coming to fruition. First,
shareholder activism has led some firms to abandon certain practices
that impede shareholder influence. Upon the insistence of institutional
investors, an increasing number of firms have dismantled staggered
boards, thus removing one barrier to hostile takeovers.46 Bylaw provisions requiring majority approval for uncontested elections of direc42

Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful
Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN.
L. REV. 887 (2002).
43
Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management
Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225 (1990); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, How
to Tie Executive Compensation to Long-Term Results, 22 J. APPL. CORP. FIN. 99
(2010) (describing how executive compensation could be fixed to achieve long-term
benefits).
44
Kahan & Rock, supra note 25, at 896-899; see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, An American Perspective on Anti-Takeover Laws in the E.U.: The German Example, in REFORMING COMPANY AND TAKEOVER LAW IN EUROPE 541, 553–54 (Guido Ferrarini,
Klaus J. Hopt, Jaap Winter & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 2004)
45
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency
Problem, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 71 (2003); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay
without Performance: Overview of the Issues, 30 J. CORP. L. 647 (2005).
46
Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 10071010 (2010); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder
Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 835, 852-856 (2005) (providing data about precatory
resolutions by activist shareholders to dismantle staggered boards)
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tors have also become more widespread,47 thus reducing managerial
control over the process.48 Second, modifications of securities law
have somewhat expanded the shareholder franchise. A July 2009
amendment of NYSE Rule 452 and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 now
prohibit brokers from voting shares held for clients in uncontested
director elections without having received instructions.49 This increases the influence of institutional investors by essentially eliminating votes that would otherwise have almost certainly been cast in the
favor of the incumbents. Recent amendments facilitate the electronic
dissemination of proxy statements, thus reducing the costs of a shareholder insurgency.50
Additional proposals are currently being debated. Most prominently, the SEC has repeatedly51 issued proposals to amend its rules
in order to expand “shareholder access” to the company’s proxy
statements, which would permit larger shareholders to place nominees for a limited number of seats on the company’s proxy statement.52 Bebchuk has suggested that shareholders should be permitted
47

STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 213 (2008) (reporting that 31% of the Fortune 500 companies had
adopted a majority voting bylaw by 2006); Kahan & Rock, id., at 1010-1011. There
was some debate whether Securities Law should require majority voting, but the
Dodd-Frank Act was passed such a provision.
48
Under plurality voting, which is the default rule (DGCL 216(3); RMBCA
7.28(a)), an unopposed candidate is elected if he gets a single vote (with all other
shareholders abstaining). Both the DGCL and the RMBCA were amended in 2006
to prohibit directors from amending bylaws that require majority voting. See William K. Sjostrom & Young Sang Kim, Majority Voting for the Election of Directors, 40 CONN. L. REV. 459, 474-479 (2007).
49
SEC Release No. 34-60215; File No. SR-NYSE-2006-92. Dodd-Frank Act § 957.
50
See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Proxy Contests in an Era of Increasing Shareholder Power: Forget Issuer Proxy Access and Focus on E-Proxy, 61 VAND. L. REV. 475, 487491 (2008); see Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 56,914, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,075, 72
Fed. Reg. 70,450 (Dec. 11, 2007) (effective Jan. 11, 2008).
51
The initial proposal was made by the SEC in 2003. See Security Holder Director
Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626, Investment Company Act Release
No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,785 (Oct. 23, 2003); Gordon, supra note 50, at
484.
52
Kahan & Rock, supra note 46, at 1022. § 971 of the Dodd-Frank Act clarifies that
the SEC has the power to pass such a regulation.

17

TAMING OR PROTECTING THE MODERN CORPORATION?

8/19/2010

to “set the rules” by allowing them to initiate important decisions
such as charter amendments or reincorporations,53 which they currently cannot do without a proposal by the board of directors.54 Dissatisfaction with managerial compensation practices has led to calls for
“say on pay” in the form of an annual shareholder vote on compensation packages.55 The Dodd-Frank Act now requires such a vote every
three years.56
Advocates of such reforms argue that greater shareholder empowerment would induce management – either directly or indirectly –
to act in the interest of shareholders, and reduce agency cost. The
underlying concern is that directors and officers, if left unconstrained,
will, on the one hand, squander the assets firm or shift them into their
own pockets through self-dealing transactions, but on the other hand,
frequently just not work hard enough to achieve the best possible result for shareholders. The normative conclusion is that shareholders
are the group whose payoff managers should seek to maximize. Since
they do not have explicit contractual rights, but are left with the
firm’s residual cash flows,57 their position is most strongly at risk.
They also have the best incentives to monitor managers and other
constituencies in order to maximize the total value of the firm.58 If
managers maximize shareholder value, it follows logically that all
other constituencies will also be fully satisfied. On the other hand, the
more pragmatic reason for shareholder primacy is the relative ease of
holding directors accountable to the clear objective of shareholder
primacy, as opposed to a multi-faceted goal including stakeholders

53

Bebchuk, supra note 46, at 865-875.
In a dispersed ownership firm, directors will typically side with entrenched management and not make proposals favoring shareholder involvement.
55
Supra note 17; see e.g. Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say on Pay”: Cautionary Notes on
the U.K. Experience and the Case for Shareholder Opt-in, 46 HARV. J. LEG. 323
(2008).
56
Dodd-Frank Act § 951 (introducing a new § 14A of the Securities Exchange Act).
57
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 11 (1991).
58
Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Cost, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 781-783 (1972).
54
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and society as a whole.59 Assuming that shareholder wealth maximization is the proper goal of corporate law, shareholder empowerment
indeed appears as a solution to accountability problems, minimizing
agency cost and optimizing incentives for directors and officers.

2.3.

Objections to shareholder empowerment

If shareholder power is indeed so beneficial, why are large
businesses typically run as corporations, where the board of directors
enjoys such great authority and control by shareholders is tightly curtailed?60 Some objections can be made within the shareholder primacy framework: Centralized management under the direction of a
board of directors has a transaction cost advantage over shareholder
decision-making, as it involves only a relatively small group of
people who (in the best case) have the information, capabilities and
incentives to run the firm well; direct control by the firms owners is
usually only workable in small enterprises. Otherwise, DGCL 141(a),
which grants broad authority to directors in spite of the obvious potential for agency cost, would be a losing proposition right from the
beginning.61 Some scholars argue that shareholders have good reasons to bind their own hands in favor of a group of experts with superior information and comparatively homogenous interests that will
avoid mutual holdup of decision-makers. For example, shareholders
may agree that corporations should maximize shareholder wealth, but
disagree about how to best pursue this goal. Given the complexity of
corporate decisions, it may be preferable to concentrate them at the
level of the board of directors, which constitutes a relatively homoge59

A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom are Managers Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1365, 1368, 1372 (1931); See Bebchuk, supra note 35, at 731 (arguing that looser
accountability also hurts stakeholders with managers’ loss of accountability to
shareholders).
60
See DGCL 141(a).(“The business and affairs of every corporation organized
under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of the board of directors [...]”).
61
E.g. Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L.
REV. 789, 792-793 (2006); John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman,
What is Corporate Law? in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 1, 13 (2nd ed.,
Reinier Kraakman et al. 2009)
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neous group of people with good information and incentive, which
will generally yield better results than bickering among potentially
heterogeneous shareholders.62 Relatedly, an argument against minority directors is that these might lead to a balkanization of the board.63
Some analysts point out that the interests of different groups
of shareholders may diverge strongly, which is likely to create friction and inhibit decision-making in corporations.64 Short-term and
long-term shareholders often have strongly divergent goals, which is
particularly relevant given the increasing role of activist short-term
investors such as hedge funds. Since capital markets are not perfectly
efficient and do not accurately reflect long-term value, some shareholders may be tempted to seek short-term profits by taking decisions
that are contrary to the long-run interest of the firm, thus undermining
an enduring productive development.65 Diversified and undiversified
shareholders are likely to have different risk preferences, and the interests of shareholders that have hedged their risks may be decoupled
from the financial welfare of the corporation.66 In fact, some shareholders may rather seek to advance their personal rent-seeking goals
resulting from opportunities to obtain private benefits of control rather than to vote in favor of the greater good of the shareholder

62

Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 199 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1744-1751
(2006); see also Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests In the
Company’s Proxy: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 BUS. LAW. 67, 73
(2008); Grant Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Democracy and the Curious Turn Toward Board Primacy, 51 Wm. & My. L. Rev. 2071, 2088 (2008)
(“”In sum, many of the arguments used to support shareholder primacy theory …
are based on shareholder homogeneity”).
63
Lipton & Rosenblum, id., at 82-83.
64
Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 577-593 (2006): contra George W. Dent, Jr., The Essential Unity of
Shareholders and the Myth of Investor Short-Termism, CASE RESEARCH PAPER
SERIES IN LEGAL STUDIES, WORKING PAPER 09-22, 8-25 (2009), at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1435400.
65
Anabtawi, id at 579-583; see also Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate Governance, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1431, 1467 (2006).
66
Anabtawi, id at 583-585, 590-592.
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class.67 Generally, the emphasis on shareholder value has been criticized as creating a short-term focus for managers who will no longer
be able to take the long-term development of the firm into account.68
Bratton and Wachter suggest that there is a tradeoff between
reducing managerial agency cost resulting from unconstrained power,
and the severe informational disadvantage of shareholders, even if
shareholders were able and willing to vote for the greater good of the
firm, and if the market price reflects historical information.69 Related
arguments focusing on misinformation of shareholders and the inability of capital markets to reflect future information has often been
brought forward in hostile takeovers, among others by prominent
practitioners such as Martin Lipton:70 Managers and directors possess
superior information over shareholders and should therefore be given
the capability to defend against hostile bids. Otherwise, shareholders
may mistakenly accept an offer at an inadequately low price, given
that the markets are unable to given sufficient weight to management’s vision for the firm, and to other factors that are hard to assess
for an outsider. This view has been a core policy reason for the Delaware courts jurisprudence on takeover defenses71, and some have argued that it has been vindicated by the rise of behavioral finance and
the fall of the efficient capital markets hypothesis.72
The recent crisis has added more fuel to the debate about
shareholder empowerment. While it may have pushed the trend towards more shareholder influence, we cannot rule out that the increased shareholder orientation of the past two decades is partly to
blame for the events, given that pressure to produce more shareholder

67

Stout, supra note 61, at 794-795.
Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Critical Look at Corporate Governance, 45 VAND. L.
REV. 1263, 1283 (1992).
69
William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 691-705 (2010).
70
Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW. 101
(1979) (arguing that shareholders benefit from takeover defenses).
71
See the case law described supra in notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
72
Lynn A. Stout, Takeovers in the Ivory Tower: How Academics Are Learning
Martin Lipton May Be Right, 60 BUS. LAW. 1435, 1440-1444 (2005).
68
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value may have led to more risk-taking, particularly in financial institutions.73
As this overview shows, detractors of shareholder empowerment tend to focus on the absence of adequate information of shareholders and problems of their decision-making process. Another
range of issues that are hard to explain under a pure contractual agency view also may play a role. As some scholars have pointed out, an
important contribution of corporate law seems to have been the establishment of a stronger degree of stability in business life. One aspect
is “entity shielding”, i.e. the protection of the corporate pool of assets
from shareholders’ individual creditors:74 If a shareholders defaults,
her personal creditors do not have recourse to the company’s assets.
This prevents the breakup of firms for reasons that have nothing to do
with how well they do and protects going concern value.75 Members
of a partnership therefore often waive their withdrawal rights for specified periods of time, while in corporations, a majority vote is required to initiate liquidation.76 The reduction of the need to monitor
the firm’s owners therefore reduces capital accumulation.77 Margaret
Blair has taken this argument further by suggesting that the “lock-in”
of capital in corporations was a historically important factor that facilitated the development of big business, as it made it much more difficult for partners or investors to withdraw (or threaten to withdraw)
73

Bratton & Wachter, supra note 69, at 716-726; see also Lucian A. Bebchuk &
Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers‘ Pay, 98 GEO. L. J. 247 (2010) (suggesting
that compensation in financial institutions should be based on total firm value instead of shareholder value).
74
See Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of
the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1343-1356 (2006).
75
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational
Law, 110 YALE L. J. 387, 403-404 (2000).
76
Hansmann et al., supra note 74, at 1348-1349. In Europe, the typical requirement
is a supermajority. See e.g. AKTG (GERMANY) § 262 I 2 (requiring 75% of the capital represented in the shareholder meeting to initiate a voluntary dissolution); C.
COM. L. 225-96 (FRANCE) (requiring a majority of two thirds for decisions of an
extraordinary shareholder meeting, which is required for voluntary dissolution under L. 225-246).See also Edward Rock, Paul Davies, Hideki Kanda & Reinier
Kraakman, Fundamental Changes, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 183, 219
(Reinier Kraakman et al. 2009).
77
Hansmann et al. id., at 1350.

22

MARTIN GELTER

8/19/2010

their contribution and thus put pressure on others relying on the continued existence of a large-scale institution.78 She argues that the delegation of decision-making authority to the board – and hence, an
absence of shareholder empowerment – helps to restrict the control
any individual large investor had on the firm, which supported the
development of large-scale, business-specific organizational capital.79
This relates to the contemporary stakeholder theory, informed
by economics, which asserts that not only shareholders, but also other
groups in the firm can be residual claimants: employees, for example,
are often thought to invest in specific human capital with limited use
outside of the particular firm, e.g. sets of skills that cannot easily be
transported elsewhere without a transition cost (which may not only
include further learning, but also moving expenses).80 Since investment of this type is costly, it will be efficient to protect employees
from “expropriation” by the group effectively controlling the firm (at
least if this group is strongly mindful of the financial interests of
shareholders). In this view, the attenuation of shareholder control
over directors, and a divergence from shareholder primacy as a matter
78

Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizations in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387 (2003); but
see Ribstein, supra note 65, at 1489 (suggesting that more sophisticated contracting
methods have largely solved these problems today).
79
Blair, id. at 433-434.
80
See e.g. HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 26 (1996); James
M. Malcolmson, Individual Employment Contracts, in 3 HANDBOOK OF LABOR
ECONOMICS 2291, 2311-2337 (Orley Aschenfelter & David Card eds. 1999) (reviewing the labor economics literature on contractual protection of specific investment); Larry Fauver & Michael E. Fuerst, Does good corporate governance include
employee representation? Evidence from German corporate boards, 82 J. FIN.
ECON. 673, 679 (2006); Edward P. Lazear, Firm-Specific Human Capital: A SkillWeights Approach, IZA DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 813 (June 2003), at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=422562 (discussing the nature of specific investment); John
C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85
MICH. L. REV. 1, 74 (1986) (discussing learning about social networks within an
organization); ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128, 35 (1994) (describing the geographical
aspect of specific investment by quoting an engineer contrasting the difficulty of
getting another job in the same industry in Texas on one hand and the easiness in
Silicon Valley on the other).
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of the objective of directorial decision-making may be beneficial because it facilitates specific investment and the long-term development
of the corporation to the benefit of all.81 Blair and Stout’s model describes the board of directors as a mediating hierarchy standing between shareholders and other corporate constituencies. Without being
strongly accountable to any specific group, the board is in the position
to assign the rents produced by the corporation to all groups, thus
permitting specific investment and allowing long-term business development.82 Excessive shareholder empowerment might result in an
opportunistic “hold up” of other team members in order to maximize
short-term shareholder value.83 While the stakeholder position has
traditionally been unpopular among those viewing corporate governance from an economic perspective, it has gained adherents in recent
years. Even in finance, stakeholder concerns seem to be taken more
seriously than they used to be. Even the latest edition of a leading
finance textbook notes that “managers and employees of a firm are
investors, too. … If you give financial capital too much power, the
human capital doesn’t show up – or if it does show up, it won’t be
properly motivated.”84 By going public, stockholders can commit
“not to interfere if managers and employees capture private benefits
when the firm is successful.”85
Irrespective of which side one takes in this debate, it is hard to
deny that both have a point: The benefits of reducing the agency cost
produced by unaccountable management have to be weighed against
the costs of shareholder involvement. Thus, there seems to be a trade81

Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999); see also Kent Greenfield, The Impact of “Going
Private” on Corporate Stakeholders, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. & FIN. L. 72, 86 (2008) (“If
management is more autonomous, it is possible for managers to use their autonomy
to allocate more of the corporate surplus to employees and other stakeholders.”)
82
Blair & Stout, id., at 288-289; see also Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales,
Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113 Q. J. ECON. 387 (1998); Bruno Frey & Margit
Osterloh, Yes, Managers Should Be Paid Like Bureaucrats, 14 J. MGMT. INQ. 96,
99-100, 101-102 (2005); see also Gelter, supra note 6, at 136-143.
83
Stout, supra note 61, at 795-797.
84
RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 949 (8th ed. 2006).
85
BREALEY ET AL., id., at 949 n.36.
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off between managerial discretion on one side and accountability to
shareholders on the other.86 For the comparative exercise of this paper, it suffices to say that the arguments on both sides are relevant and
were therefore considered significant by participants in the historical
debates. The crucial point I seek to make is that their relative importance historically was, and maybe still is different in the US on the
one hand and in France and Germany on the other, given differences
in structures of corporate control.

2.4. Vehicles of the debate: How do “legal” theories about
the nature of the corporation matter?
Before looking at the national shareholder-stakeholder controversies, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by the debate about the
legal nature of the corporation, given that the two were often linked.
Historically, scholars and courts have construed corporations have
been construed as “artificial entities”, “aggregates”, or “natural entities”, with each theory being identified with different political currents.87 While the “artificial entity” theory emphasizes the role of the
state in creating the corporation,88 the “aggregate theory” focuses on
the underlying contractual relationship. The “natural entity” theory
emphasizes the existence of the corporation outside the law, which
merely reflects the social reality.
In the US, a great point of contention has often been whether
corporations should enjoy constitutional protections against government like natural persons, most recently in the Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision on corporate speech.89 A natural entity theory
86

Alessio M. Pacces, Controlling the Corporate Controller’s Misbehaviour, RILE
WORKING PAPER NO. 2009/01, 8-11 (2009), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1327800.
87
John C. Coates IV, Note: State Takeover Statutes and Corporate Theory: The
Revival of an Old Debate, 64 NYU L. REV. 806, 809 (1989); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate Form: A Historical Perspective on
Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767, 772-793 (2005) (tracing
the theories through Ancient Roman and medieval sources).
88
A famous endorsement of the theory is Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S.
518 (1819); see Avi-Yonah, id., at 789.
89
Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 50 (2010).
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implies a stronger protection of the corporation against the government, which was an issue in several 19th century cases.90 However,
the meaning of corporate personhood under the Constitution is only
peripherally related to the debates studied in this paper, which dealt
with the governance of the relationship between firms and their managers, shareholders and other stakeholders. The aggregate or contractual theory is more often identified with the “shareholder” position in
the debate about the purpose of corporate law, both with respect to
shareholder empowerment, and an understanding of the corporation
as serving the interest of shareholders. The two entity theories, particularly the natural entity one, are often identified with a broader objective, and a more independent position of management. In Germany,
this “reification” of the corporation is often traced to the theory of the
“association” of Otto von Gierke, who understood legal personality as
the reflection of social reality.91 On the basis of his historical study of
German medieval law, he suggested that human beings were able to
form fellowships that developed an autonomous existence that was
necessary for social fulfillment.92 Thus, he became internationally
known as the forefather of natural entity theory.93 His work was po90

See Coates, supra note 87, at 809-825. The victory of the “natural entity” theory
is usually identified with Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 118 U.S.
394 (1886); contra Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of
Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173 (1985) (arguing that the court’s famous
dictum was grounded in the contemporary “aggregate theory”). Similarly, AviYonah argues that the trajectory of the two federal cases on the constitutionality of
antitakeover statutes ended in a victory for the real entity theory. Avi-Yonah, id., at
803-810. The two cases are Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), and CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
91
OTTO GIERKE, DAS DEUTSCHE GENOSSENSCHAFTSRECHT (1868). This position
was much later espoused in a graphic way by ADOLF A. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY
CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 18-19 (1954) (describing how a corporation would continue to operate if its charter were canceled by the state).
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ROGER SCRUTON, THE PHILOSOPHER ON DOVER BEACH 59 (1990).
93
See e.g. Horwitz, supra note 90, at 179; Ron Harris, The Transplantation of the
Legal Discourse on Corporate Personality Theories: From German Codification to
British Political Pluralism and American Big Business, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1421, 1431-1435 (2006) (both describing Gierke’s theories and their reception in
Britain and the US); Hasso Hofmann, From Jhering to Radbruch: On the Logic of
Traditional Legal Concepts to the Social Theories of Law to the Renewal of Legal
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pularized in English-speaking countries by Frederic Maitland in the
early years of the 20th century, and a number of English political and
legal theorists began to entertain a “natural entity” view.94 Gierke’s
longstanding influence may have helped to spread an institutional
understanding of corporate law in Continental Europe, at least in
Germany. However, a “stakeholder debate” was not yet on the horizon during his lifetime. Gierke’s core concerns were very fundamental ones, most of all the possibility of citizens to freely form associations, and the recognition of legal capacity and personality of the latter. Still, his natural entity theory later helped to underscore the legitimacy of managerial control95 and influenced the German debate of
the 1920s and 1930s.96 Similarly, Merrick Dodd, who came to be seen
as the forerunner of American stakeholder theory as a result of his

Idealism, in A HISTORY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN THE CIVIL LAW WORLD,
1600-1900, 301, 335 (Damiano Canale, Paolo Grossi & Hasso Hofmann eds. 2009);
see also Coates, supra note 87, at 818 (citing Gierke as one of the original proponents of the natural entity theory of the corporation). Gierke favored collectivism
over the individualism embodied in Roman law (Mathias Reimann, Nineteenth
Century German Legal Science, 31 B.C. L. REV. 837, 871 (1990); Hofmann, id., at
331) and criticized the draft for the German Civil Code for the absence of social
elements. OTTO GIERKE, DER ENTWURF EINES BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHES UND
DAS DEUTSCHE RECHT (1889).
94
See Frederic William Maitland, Translator’s Introduction, in POLITICAL THEORY
OF THE MIDDLE AGES vii, xviii-xliii (Otto Gierke, translated with an introduction by
Frederic William Maitland, 1900); FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, 3 THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND 310-326 (1911); see also A.V.
DICEY, LECTURES ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGnd
LAND DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 154 (2 ed. 1914); see also Harold Laski,
The Personality of Associations, 29 HARV. L. REV. 404, 413 (1916) (describing the
corporation as a “real entity, with a personality that is self-created”); John Dewey,
The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L. J. 655, 665 n.
13 (1926).
95
William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 425 (1989).
96
See ARNDT RIECHERS, DAS “UNTERNEHMEN AN SICH” 53-55 (1996) (describing
the influence of Gierke on authors of the 1920s).
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rebuttal to Berle97, used a natural entity theory to suggest that managers should have wider responsibilities than merely to shareholders.98
The rise of economic analysis of corporate law has somewhat
blurred these frontlines, although adherents of this school often speak
of the corporation as a “nexus of contracts.” In spite of the linguistic
similarity, it would be wrong to identify this model the old contractual theory, as the corporate nexus is meant to include relationships
with employees, creditors, suppliers and others, while the traditional
contractual theory focuses only on the contract between shareholders
as members of the corporation, thus interpreting it as an aggregate of
shareholder interests. While economic analysis of corporate law
tended to emphasize only shareholders in its earlier years,99 stakeholder theories based on the idea of specific investment of other corporate constituencies merely differ in the assumption that regular contracts do not provide complete protection for these groups, but are
still firmly grounded within the nexus framework.100 Furthermore,
proponents of a shareholder wealth maximization view of corporate
law have shown how the corporation as an independent entity can
provide long-term commitment to creditors, but to the ultimate benefit of shareholders.101
In the historical debates that are the primary subject of this article, however, the dividing lines are clear: Contractual theories ultimately view shareholders as owners of assets striking a deal among
each other; thus, the corporation obviously must pursue shareholder
interests. According to institutional theories, the corporation as distinct entity has emancipated itself from mere shareholder interests,
which makes it rhetorically easier to justify limitations on shareholder
power and an emphasis on stakeholder interest.
97

Infra section 3.
E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Managers Trustees? 45 HARV. L. REV.
1145, 1160-1162 (1931); see David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990
DUKE L. J. 201, 216-220.
99
E.g. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 57, at 12.
100
The most prominent one is the “team production” model. See Blair & Stout,
supra note 81. The “nexus of contracts” thus morphs into a “nexus of specific investment.” Id. at 275.
101
Supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
98
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3. Preeminent managerial power: contextualizing the
historical US debate
The US debate is well known and is therefore kept short, but it
needs to be contextualized for the comparative objective of this paper.
Section 3.1 describes this debate and emphasizes the significance of
dispersed ownership for it. This is the feature of corporate governance
in most large US firms that distinguishes them internationally and has
also created the model that captured the imagination of American
corporate law scholars. A large degree of institutional independence
was self-evident, as was managerial power and debates about the necessity of curbing it. Section 3.2 discusses the role of jurisprudence
regarding the “shareholder primacy norm”, and why it has little to add
to the discussion. Section 3.3 explains how US corporate governance
was differed from the German and French systems discussed in the
subsequent chapters, and how this difference influenced the respective shareholder-stakeholder debates.

3.1.

Berle, Dodd, and dispersed ownership

The cornerstones of the academic paradigm set by the BerleDodd debate of the 1930s. In the course of finalizing the seminal treatise with Gardiner Means102, Adolf Berle published an article in the
Harvard Law Review emphasizing the fiduciary position of directors
and analogizing from trust law to corporate law. Having empirically
studied the separation of ownership and control and identified what
we would now call agency problems, he argued for great judicial discretion to police conduct by managers.103 His original concern was
not the relationship between a firm and non-shareholder constituencies, but chiefly the protection of shareholders against management
and particularly their equal treatment in issues such as preemptive
rights and dividend payments. Merrick Dodd, another luminary of
corporate law at that time, argued against Berle’s suggestion that
102

BERLE & MEANS, supra note 7.
Adolf A. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049
(1931).
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stockholders should be considered the sole beneficiaries of corporate
activity, as large corporations had become the subject of public interest and developed a life and a responsibility of their own as a going
concern.104 As distant stockholders could hardly become subject to “a
professional spirit of public service”,105 the board had discretion to
act also in favor of other interests would be more socially desirable.
Managers should not be seen as fiduciaries of shareholders, but rather
of the corporation as an institution instead of its members.106 Berle
promptly rebutted Dodd’s critique, arguing that private property was
an essential element of American society, providing income streams
in times of old age, childhood and sickness. If management were not
strictly accountable to passive proprietors, management would further
primarily its own welfare (to the detriment of everyone else).107 However, in 1954 Berle conceded that Dodd’s point of view had prevailed.108
From reading the last chapters of Berle and Means’ book, one
could infer that Berle modified his position as early as 1932. The two
authors speculate that corporate law may be moving toward a new
concept, in the course of which the owners of the firm would lose full
control over the corporation, to the benefit of “the paramount interests
of the community”, allowing “corporate leaders” to “set forth a program comprising fair wages, security to employees, reasonable service to their public, and stabilization of business, all of which would
divert a portion of the profit from the owners.”109 Berle almost
seemed to join Dodd. One could possibly conclude that Berle’s position was inconsistent, or that the chapter only reflected Gardiner
Means’ views.110
104

Dodd, supra note 98, at 1145.
Dodd, id., at 1153.
106
Dodd, id., at 1162-1163.
107
Berle, supra note 59, at 1365.
108
BERLE, supra note 91, at 169; see also Adolf A. Berle, Foreword, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY ix, xii (Edward S. Mason ed. 1959).
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BERLE & MEANS, supra note 7, at 355-356.
110
See William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn,
26 J. CORP. L. 737, 761-762 (2001); Dalia Tsuk, From Pluralism to Individualism:
Berle and Means and 20th-Century American Legal Thought, 30 L. & SOC. INQ.
179, 205-209 (2005); see also Marc T. Moore & Antoine Rebérioux, Corporate
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Bratton and Wachter recently suggested a persuasive interpretation of this exchange against the background of political struggles
surrounding the New Deal. They explain that Berle and Dodd were
adherents of different varieties of corporatism that were endorsed by
different groups of pundits vying for the attention of the future president Franklin Roosevelt.111 While reformers in both camps agreed
that more centralized planning was needed to avoid the excesses of
the capitalist system that had brought about the crisis, they differed on
important details. The “business commonwealth” camp, some of
whose representatives Dodd cites in his article, favored planning on
the industry level, with powerful managers taking a prominent role.
The Progressives, who went on to prevail in the early years of the
Roosevelt administration, favored government planning and a significant role of unions. Berle was a partisan of this group and played a
prominent role in the planning of the New Deal.112 When his rebuttal
to Dodd appeared in print, the book with Means was in the final stage
of completion, and he had already transformed from his earlier incarnation as an analyst of corporate law doctrine into a New Deal Progressive. While he did not disclose these new goals in his rebuttal, his
argument is, at its core, based on the idea that the elimination of the
fiduciary obligation of management to shareholders would endow
them with undesirable absolute power.113 Seen in the light of Dodd’s
adherence to the pro-management camp in the political debate,
Berle’s opposition to a broader duty of managers within corporate law
seems consistent with both his earlier articles and his work with
Means. He believed that, absent regulation, a strict duty to shareholders was the best check on managerial power, and Berle and Means
were not only concerned with the separation of ownership from control, but maybe even more with the concentration of economic power
Power in the Public Eye: Reassessing the Implications of Berle’s Public Consensus
Theory, 33 U. SEATTLE L. REV. 1109, 1113-1117 (2010) (describing the view of
Berle as a forerunner of agency theory as a myth).
111
William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist
Origins: Adolf Berle and the Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 122-124
(2008).
112
Bratton & Wachter, id.
113
Berle, supra note 59, at 1367.
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in the hands of a few:114 Acknowledging the suggestion of a corporation serving the community on its own accord to be utopian, they
suggested that the implementation of a “communitarian” conception
of the corporation would first require a “convincing system” to be
worked out, in which the problem of too many principals (as we
might say today) would be resolved.115
In his later work, Berle acknowledged that Dodd’s position
had been proven right in the end (even on normative grounds), arguing that the managerial class should accept the responsibility resulting from power; if they would not, America was likely to become
more statist, as government would have to step in.116 Bratton and
Wachter suggest that for Berle, Dodd’s position had not been right at
the time of its publication in 1932, but had become the right answer
only as a result of the New Deal regulatory state. Under the new system, a large part of the economy was subject to regulation in which
public policy was able to shape managerial action.117 In 1962, Berle
affirmed his belief that managers could be more trusted to live up to
the necessarily high standards in their powerful function in 1962 than
they were in the late 1920s for this reason.118
For the objective of this paper, the most important point is that
both Berle and Dodd were clearly taking their positions against the
backdrop of powerful management and passive investors. The subsequent corporate law debate remained within the path prepared by the
Berle-Dodd exchange. Participants differed whether managers were
part of the problem and needed to be constrained, or whether they
were part of the solution and deserved more discretion. By and large,
analysts, including Berle, resigned to managerial power given the
circumstances, but offered few alternatives. If they did, they were
grounded rather in regulation than in corporate law.119 Managerial
114

Tsuk, supra note 110 (pointing out this aspect of Berle and Means).
BERLE & MEANS, supra note 7, at 356.
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BERLE, supra note 91, at 172-173.
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Bratton & Wachter, supra note 111, at 133-134.
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Adolf A. Berle, Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 62 COLUM. L. REV.
433, 437 (1962).
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A.A. BERLE, JR., POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY 107-110 (1959); see also Abram
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power came to be seen as an inevitable technological and organizational development, as shown by Alfred Chandler’s famous historical
account, which credited the rise of the managerial class for the development of the large firm and its success.120 John Kenneth Galbraith
argued that the firm’s “technostructure”, composed of managers and
other leading groups in the corporation, resulted in a situation where
it led a life on its own, distant from the shareholder.121 Galbraith had
no particular prescription for corporate governance and, maybe typical for this period, acknowledged that the goal of the firm was in
practice no longer profit maximization (as neoclassical producer
theory had assumed), but growth and market share. Shareholders
seemingly were of little concern, and the stock price was of some
minor psychological importance at best.122 Some scholars even believed shareholder voting rights to be so unimportant that they considered their abolition.123
It seems that the typical view of this period to “abuses” of
power would have been government intervention: Berle argued that
the legitimacy of the power of self-perpetuating managers was the
public consensus,124 and Eugene Rostow suspected that excessive use
of managerial power for political goals might trigger legislative reactions.125 William Cary’s critique of the purported “race to the bottom”126 can be understood as part of the same trend, as can be Ralph
Nader’s proposal to “tame the giant corporations” by introducing fedMODERN SOCIETY 25, 40-41 (Edward S. Mason ed. 1959) (arguing that the voiceless
position of shareholders is in fact deserved, as they are sufficiently protected by
disclosure requirements).
120
CHANDLER, supra note 23; see also Edward S. Mason, Introduction, in THE
CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 1, 9-10 (Edward S. Mason ed. 1959).
121
GALBRAITH, supra note 23.
122
Berle, supra note 118, at 446.
123
Chayes, supra note 119, at 151; Bayless Manning, Review of Livingston: The
American Stockholder, 67 YALE L. J. 1477, 1490-1493 (1958).
124
BERLE, supra note 119, at 109-110.
125
Eugene V. Rostow, To Whom and For What Ends is Corporate Management
Responsible? in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 46, 68 (Edward S. Mason
ed. 1959).
126
William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware,
83 YALE L. J. 663 (1974).
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eral chartering.127 Milton Friedman’s famous 1970 essay against corporate social responsibility128 seems to have represented a minority
opinion during that period. In any case, the most important overall
concern characterizing the debate of that time was not shareholders,
but the absence of compelling legitimacy of managerial power that
was thought to go beyond the economic sphere.129 All of these scholars shared a concern about striking the right balance in the regulation
of management activity primarily with a view to the shareholdermanager relationship. With the development of the law and economics movement in the 1960s and 1970s, markets (including capital
markets, product markets, and the market for managerial labor) were
recognized as an additional constraint on managerial decisionmaking.130 This, however, did not change the fundamental nature of
the conflict of interest between atomistic shareholders and strong
managers with which analysts were preoccupied.

3.2.

The irrelevance of corporate jurisprudence

This brief account of the debate shows one important pattern:
as one would expect in light of the prevailing share ownership patterns, the issue at hand remained whether and how to constrain powerful managers. In the academic debate, shareholder primacy served
to constrain managers, while the stakeholder argument did the opposite. Berle was a reformer fighting for investors, while Dodd was
aligned with managerial interests.
Corporate case law addressing the “shareholder primacy
norm” shows a different picture. Most Delaware cases plainly state
that directors and officers hold a fiduciary duty to the corporation and

127

NADER ET AL., supra note 19. See particularly id., at 75 (“in nearly every large
American business corporation, there exists a management autocracy”).
128
Friedman, supra note 4.
129
E.g. Mason, supra note 120, at 5-9; Rostow, supra note 125, at 60.
130
For an important early contribution see Henry Manne, Mergers and the Market
for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965).
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its shareholders, and have to act in the best interests of both.131 This
seems to support an “entity” view and could even underscore a stakeholders view,132 but analyzing linguistic details provides little benefit,
given the scarcity of true shareholder-stakeholder conflicts outside of
the takeover context. The most well-known cases discussing “shareholder primacy” are old and not from leading corporate law jurisdictions, the most cited ones being Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. and
Shlensky v. Wrigley.
In Dodge133, Henry Ford, the majority shareholder and director of Ford Motors, then a privately held firm, intended to retain earnings in order to expand the company and ultimately bring down the
price of cars produced. The plaintiff Dodge brothers, who held a minority stake,134 desired a dividend because they needed the money to
set up a competing operation.135 Ford argued that he was well within
his rights to pursue his strategy, which he professed was motivated by
“social and altruistic reasons.”136 The Michigan Supreme Court objected by enunciating the now famous “shareholder primacy norm”:
131

E.g. Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (1939), Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811
(Del. 1984); Smith v. van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993).
132
See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr. & Christopher W. Frost, Managers‘ Fiduciary
Duties in Financially Distressed Corporations: Chaos in Delaware (and Elsewhere), 2007 J. CORP. L. 491, 493-494 (speculating about the interpretation of the
term). At the very least, the Delaware courts seem to assume that the “entity” stands
for the wealth of all financial investors. See Credit Lyonnais Bank Netherlands,
N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corporation, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215 at n. 55
(Dec. 30, 1991) (exploring the possibility of fiduciary duties to creditors in the
vicinity of insolvency); N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 2007 Del. LEXIS 227 (finding that directors do not have direct fiduciary
duties to creditors, but suggesting that creditors may bring derivative claims on
behalf of the corporation if the firm is nearly insolvent and they are thus the residual
claimants).
133
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
134
For a list of Ford shareholders in 1908, see M. Todd Henderson, The Story of
Dodge v. Ford Motor Company: Everything Old is New Again, in CORPORATE LAW
STORIES 37, 49 (J. Mark Ramseyer ed. 2009).
135
Henderson, id., at 57. For a detailed account of the facts see D. Gordon Smith,
The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 315-320 (1998).
136
ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 603 (1986).

35

TAMING OR PROTECTING THE MODERN CORPORATION?

8/19/2010

“[a] business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The
powers of the directors are to be employed for that
end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in
the choice of means to attain that end and does not extend to a change in the end itself […].”137
Ford later bought the Dodge brothers’ share, continued to pay
high wages and produce many cars, and as a result made the company
even more profitable.138
In Shlensky, decided in Illinois in 1968,139 the plaintiff sought
to compel the directors of a baseball team to install lights at the stadium, thus allowing evening games, a higher spectator turnout and
more profits. Wrigley, 80% shareholder and president of the corporation, objected "that baseball is a 'daytime sport' and that the installation of lights and night baseball games will have a deteriorating effect
upon the surrounding neighborhood."140 The court did not object to
the contestable argument that this would ultimately hurt the firm, thus
resulting in a long-term decline of shareholder wealth. In doing so, it
effectively deferred the decision to the directors’ business judgment
in the absence of any personal conflict of interest.
Two lessons are to be drawn. First, shareholder primacy is not
enforceable – it all depends on how incumbents rationalize their decision. Dodd was among the first to note that the Dodge court cautiously avoided an “unqualified acceptance of the maximum-profit-forstockholders formula.”141 Modern commentators generally share this
view. Lynn Stout points out that the precedent is hardly ever cited by
courts.142 Robert Clark argues that Henry Ford’s mistake was not his
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Henry G. Manne, The Limits and Rationale of Corporate Altruism: An Individualistic Model, 59 VA. L. REV. 708, 713 (1973).
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decision as such but his purported social motivation,143 while in fact
he intended to expand the company and, most of all, suppress the
Dodge brothers’ nascent competitive venture by forcing them to sell
him their shares at a low price.144 Thus, Ford’s professed philanthropic inclinations were a cover for actions that harmed other shareholders. By contrast, most managerial decisions with a potential shareholder-stakeholder conflict of interests are protected by the business
judgment rule.145 This is illustrated by Shlensky, given how the defendant was able to turn a “social” argument into a shareholder primacy one. Ford probably could have done the same.146
Second, both cases arose in privately-held firms with a clear
majority shareholder and illustrate rather a majority-minority conflict
than a shareholder-stakeholder one. Commentators often emphasize
that the shareholder primacy norm is irrelevant in publicly traded corporations,147 suggesting that modern courts would rather employ a
duty of loyalty and minority oppression rhetoric in similar situations
today, which had not yet been developed by the courts at that time.148
The case law on the “shareholder primacy norm” has very little to do
with the questions that animated the academic debate before hostile

tially a dictum that is rarely cited by courts); Henderson, supra note 134, at 34
(“[shareholder wealth maximization] was not and is not the law.”).
143
Cf. CLARK, supra note 136, at 138, 603; see also Jonathan R. Macey, A Close
Read of an Excellent Commentary on Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 177,
182 (2008).
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Cf. CLARK, id., at 604; see also Nathan Oman, Corporations and Autonomy
Theories of Contract: A Critique of the New Lex Mercatoria, 83 DEN. U. L. Rev.
101, 135 (2005) (providing a similar account of Dodge v. Ford).
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Stephen M. Bainbridge, Means and Ends, supra note 62, at 582; see also Einer
Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV.
733, 775 (2005) (“So even Dodge, the high-water mark for the supposed duty to
profit-maximize, indicates that no such enforceable duty exists.”); Macey, supra
note 143, at 181, 190.
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Ribstein, supra note 65, at 1470.
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Smith, supra note 135, at 277.
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E.g. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype, 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975). See Smith, supra note 135, at 320-322.
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takeovers emerged: or concede that it is of little practical relevance,149
particularly because of the business judgment rule. The controversy
about Ford’s dividend had nothing to do with the small investor
whose interests are neglected by powerful managers where control
was separated from ownership. Addressing issues of closely held corporations with controlling shareholders, the cases rather fall into the
Continental European pattern discussed in sections 4 and 5, where the
question is not whether and to what extent to align managers with
shareholders, but whether and how to constrain blockholders.

3.3.

How the US differs from Germany and France

Managerial power was the motivator of the historical US debate, and the best balance of powers between shareholders and directors is still debated. As we will see subsequently, institutional theories
of corporate law have been historically prominent in Germany and
France. In consequence of different ownership structures, institutional
theories of the corporation had a function they did not have in the US.
Here, a large degree of independence of management was always
taken for granted, given the strong position of the board in those firms
in which most scholars were interested. Arguments against shareholder empowerment are made in defense of the status quo. Their
proponents suggest that US corporate law works if shareholders remain largely disenfranchised.
Models of corporate law explaining the benefits of managerial
power only work well in a corporate system characterized by an
“atomistic” share ownership structure,150 where shareholders vote on
few things, and when they do, they are a faceless mass of tiny financial investors. Where managers are de facto always subject to a risk
of being replaced by a controlling shareholder, they will obviously be
149

E.g. Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 651 (2006) (“no modern court has struck down
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(3nd ed. 2009).
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inclined to please him to avoid eviction.151 When there is no single
controlling shareholder, but a number of blockholders in controlling
or changing coalitions that carry some influence, managers and directors have a reason to please the members of these coalitions. Controlling shareholders may abuse their position to obtain private benefits
from the firm, to the detriment of minority shareholders and other
stakeholders, who may be concerned that shareholders may use their
power to harm them.152. Minority investors will be concerned that
controlling shareholders will do with the firm as they please and take
large private benefits.153 And even if there is no single controlling
shareholder, but there are blocks of share ownership that can jointly
impose their will on the firm if enough of them cooperate, there is the
additional problem of friction. Coalitions may change, and corporate
policies may therefore lack stability.
In Germany and France during the periods of these historical
debates, dispersed ownership structure was not widespread, which is
why friction between shareholders must have been common. In the
following two chapters, I suggest that institutional theories of corporate law had a great appeal in the debates in the early period of those
two corporate law systems particularly because share ownership
structures were not dispersed. Shielding corporations against shareholders was seen as an instrument to mitigate disruptive intrashareholders conflicts, and to protect the firm and all of its stakeholders against shareholders opportunism.
There are of course also important political implications: Unlike the United States, where managerial bureaucrats had replaced
large blockholders as a politically powerful elite,154 “capitalist”
shareholders persisted in France and Germany. To those concerned
151
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how corporations could help to pursue the public interest, danger to
that purpose was emanating from those shareholders, and not primarily from management. One could summarize the difference to the US
by saying that the debate was not about the optimal extent of constraints on management, but of constraints on shareholder power.

4. German block ownership and the theory of the
“Unternehmen an sich“
The German corporate governance system is notorious for its
focus on stakeholder interests.155 The main reason is codetermination
on German supervisory boards, which creates a limited, but significant influence of employees on corporate decision-making by granting them a number of mandatory seats.156 While its roots can be
traced back to the early years after World War I,157 the current system
took shape after World War II – partially in response to the large
firms’ cooperation with the Nazis,158 and culminated in the 1976 Act,
which requires equal representation in firms with more than 2000
employees.159
German corporate law has also long been dominated by an
understanding of the corporation as an entity distinct from shareholders and the idea of an “interest of the firm” or “of the business.” The
155

Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 444-446.
See e.g. Katharina Pistor, Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model with Governance Externalities, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 163 (Margaret
M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds. 1999); Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, The Basic Governance Structure: Minority Shareholders and NonShareholder Constituencies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 89, 100-101
(2nd ed. Reinier Kraakman et al. 2009).
157
Employee participation was introduced shortly after World War I, but abolished
by the Nazis. HERMAN KNUDSEN, EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION IN EUROPE 32 (1995);
Pistor, id., at 166; Otto Kahn-Freund, Industrial Democracy, 6 INDUS. L. J. 65, 8384 (1977) (describing it as a “half-hearted scheme”); Roth, supra note 31, at 62-63.
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KNUDSEN, id., at 33. There was concern that the Western allies might otherwise
have dismantled the iron and steel industries. Pistor, supra note 156, at 167; Roth,
supra note 31, at 73.
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Pistor, id., at 168-175. In the case of a tied vote, the vote of the chairman, who is
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theoretical underpinnings go back to an academic debate of the 1920s
and early 1930s. Section 4.1 describes the environment to which this
debate reacted, namely a system with powerful (controlling) shareholders. Section 4.2 describes the development of German institutional theory of the “business in itself” during the 1920s and 1930s, and
what influence it had on the 1937 corporate law reform. Section 4.3
looks at its post-war reception and its consequences for corporate law
today, and section 4.4 looks at the Mannesmann decision as a prominent example. Section 4.5 concludes by linking it to ownership structure and the overarching thesis of this article.

4.1.

In the realm of majority shareholders

One might feel tempted to trace the German proclivity to an
institutional theory of the corporation and stakeholder orientation to
19th century legal theory. However, while Otto von Gierke’s espousal
of a natural entity theory of the firm near the end of the 19th century160
is well known, the roots of a German “stakeholder theory” are more
recent. Legal policy remained steeped in economic liberalism in the
late 19th and the early 20th century, and the law continued to emphasize shareholders’ ownership of the corporation, as a result of which
shareholders retained complete control over corporate matters during
that period.161 For example, the Reichsgericht (the German Supreme
Court at that time), opined in a 1904 decision that the purpose of the
corporation is “to work for shareholders and to reassign its assets to
them, during its existence in the form of profits, after its dissolution
by means of distribution.”162 While the context of this statement is
highly peculiar and the significance of the rhetoric should not be exaggerated,163 subsequent decisions – primarily addressing majority160

OTTO GIERKE, DAS DEUTSCHE GENOSSENSCHAFTSRECHT (1868).
Gerald Spindler, Verfassung der Aktiengesellschaft: Vorbemerkung, note 8, in
MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESETZ, BAND 3 (3rd ed., Wulf Goette,
Christian Habersack & Susanne Kalss eds, 2008).
162
RGZ 59, 423, 425 [own translation].
163
Like other “shareholder primacy v. stakeholder” cases, the decision arose from a
conflict among shareholders. The core issue was whether the founding founding
shareholders’ oral commitment to proportionally reimburse the corporation for the
161
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minority conflicts – continued to be based on a contractual understanding of the firm. Up to the 1920s, the “interest of the corporation”
continued to be defined as what had been decided in the shareholder
meeting,164 e.g. in the Hibernia case, where the majority (several
banks) had decided to issue preferred shares (without preemptive
rights) in order to prevent the Prussian government from gaining control.165

4.2.

The dark origins of German institutionalism

Subsequently, the Weimar Republic saw a debate about the
concept of the “enterprise in itself” (Unternehmen an sich) during the
Weimar Republic, which is usually cited as the origin of the movement towards what we might call stakeholder orientation today, but is
more accurately described as the beginning of the emancipation of the
corporation from its shareholders. The most important antecedent of
the debate was Walther Rathenau, who published a booklet about the
state of affairs of corporations in 1917 (“Vom Aktienwesen”).166 Rathenau was an industrialist, social theorist, and politician.167 Describing how German corporations had been transformed from ventures of
a small number of business partners into truly great enterprises during
the past decades, and how family ownership was disappearing,168 he
addressed various corporate governance issues such as the role of the
members of the supervisory board. Corporate law, he argued, had not
been able to keep up with progress. His main concern, however, was
apparently interference from shareholders. To some extent his treatadministrative costs of incorporation qualfied as a gift, which would have required
notarization to be enforceable.
164
RGZ 68, 314, 317; RGZ 85, 170, 172; RGZ 107, 67, 71. See FRANK LAUX, DIE
LEHRE VOM UNTERNEHMEN AN SICH 37-38 (1998) (surveying the case law).
165
RGZ 68, 235, 246.
166
WALTHER RATHENAU, VOM AKTIENWESEN. EINE GESCHÄFTLICHE BETRACHTUNG (1917). For good overviews see e.g. ADOLF GROSSMANN, UNTERNEHMENSZIELE IM AKTIENRECHT 141-143 (1980); RIECHERS, supra note 96, at 7-10.
167
A member of the liberal Deutsche Demokratische Partei (German Democratic
Party), he was assassinated by right-wing extremists while serving as foreign minister in 1922.
168
RATHENAU, id., at 7-13, 23-25.
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ment of shareholder involvement seems odd to a modern reader
schooled in thinking about corporate governance in terms of ownership structures and agency problems. He did not distinguish between
blockholders and dispersed investors, but between long-term shareholders expecting an adequate yield on their investment and speculators seeking short-term capital gains.169 Rathenau was preoccupied
mainly with the latter group and denounced, for example, that corporate law no longer required a minimum time period of stock ownership before a shareholder was entitled to vote.170 He also criticized
that legal scholars, courts and newspapers frequently exhorted managers to follow the wishes of the shareholder meeting.171 In spite of
being an advocate of democracy in the political arena, he pointed out
that even democratic states typically do not allow parliament to vote
on each and every issue, but delegate day-to-day activities to a smaller group of people.172 Hypothesizing that the shareholders of Deutsche Bank could vote to liquidate the firm, he argued that the government could not allow this to happen and would surely interfere by
passing a special law.173 He did not clarify why the firm’s assets
should be worth more than the stock price, so that it would pay for
shareholders to vote for such a proposal and invest the proceeds in
government bonds;174 however, in this context he made his famous
connection between corporate law and the public interest, suggesting
that large firms were an important factor in the national economy,
whose significance exceeded private interests by far.175
169

RATHENAU, id., at 26.
RATHENAU, id., at 29.
171
RATHENAU, id., at 34.
172
RATHENAU, id., at 59.
173
RATHENAU, id., at 39. Landsberger, writing in 1932, sees Rathenau’s prediction
as confirmed in view of government intervention in favor of banks during the global
economic crisis. See Herbert Landsberger, Der Rechtsgedanke des „Unternehmens
an sich“ und das neue Aktienrecht, 7 ZENTRALBLATT FÜR HANDELSRECHT 79, 82
(1932).
174
Theoretically, such a theory might have arisen if the government had pressured
Deutsche Bank e.g. into extending unprofitable loans. Rathenau discusses this possibility in the context of the war economy, which may explain the particular concern for the public interest.
175
RATHENAU, id., at 38.
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While this reference has often been interpreted as promoting a
communitarian conception of the economy,176 Rathenau’s booklet
rather gives the impression of a director complaining about annoying
shareholders than that of one developing an economic or social
theory. Haussmann, Rathenau’s most frequently cited critic, explained that his classification of shareholders and his focus on speculative investors with his personal experience at AEG, the German
equivalent to GE founded by Rathenau’s father. In that company,
management indeed faced “an unspecified multitude of shareholders
without a particular majority group.”177 Haussmann criticized that
Rathenau gave insufficient consideration to the role of large shareholders, while in reality firms with majority groups were more common.178 In a longer book published in 1918 (“Von kommenden Dingen”), in which Rathenau summarized his social, political and economic visions, he described how large corporations were turning into
“institutions resembling the state”179 He suggested that the “joy of
creation” was already overshadowing the desire for financial profit,
and that the “official idealism identical with that prevailing in public
service” dominated.180 It may well have been this highly optimistic
view of both management and public service that encouraged his
hopes that autonomous corporations, standing between the private
176

See Oskar Netter, Zur aktienrechtlichen Theorie des „Unternehmens an sich“, in
FESTSCHRIFT HERRN RECHTSANWALT UND NOTAR JUSTIZRAT DR. JUR.H.C. ALBERT
PINNER ZU SEINEM 75. GEBURTSTAG 507, 547-550 (Deutscher Anwaltsverein, Berliner Anwaltsverein & Firma Walter De Gruyter & Co. eds. 1932) (criticizing
Haussmann for exaggerating Rathenau’s communitarian ideas).
177
FRITZ HAUSSMANN, VOM AKTIENWESEN UND VOM AKTIENRECHT 20 (1928).
Haussmann uses the term “AEG type” to describe firms that we might call “BerleMeans” type firms today. It is possible that hyperinflation had led to increased
ownership concentration in the early 1920s. Infra notes 195-197 and accompanying
text. Against this backdrop, Netter’s assessment that Rathenau wanted to protect the
majority from the minority does not seem accurate. See Netter, id., at 552.
178
HAUSSMANN, id., at 26.
179
WALTHER RATHENAU, VON KOMMENDEN DINGEN 143 (1918). Other than his
booklet on corporate law, this work was also translated into English and cited by
Berle and Means. See WALTHER RATHENAU, IN DAYS TO COME 121 (transl. Eden &
Cedar Paul 1921).
180
RATHENAU, VON KOMMENDEN DINGEN, id., at 144-145; RATHENAU, IN DAYS TO
COME, id., at 122-123.
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sector and the state, could become a building block of the postcapitalist society he was expecting to develop.181
At first glance it might seem that Rathenau, the publication of
whose 1917 booklet is often seen as a defining moment for the German debate (i.e. comparable to the role of the Berle-Dodd debate in
the US), cannot easily be placed into the theory of this article, given
the apparent assumption of a dispersed ownership structure. However,
it is indeed typically Continental, as the dispersed ownership structure
described by Rathenau is not entirely the atomistic version encountered by Berle and Means, where shareholders are purely passive, but
a distinct German variety, where they are not. His concern was clearly not excessive managerial power, but the intervention of shareholders (both the majority and the demands of investors), for example by
requesting dividends, thus depleting liquidity. Managers had to make
concessions to these demands. While Americans were discussing the
extent of managerial power and whether to constrain them, Rathenau’s concern was how to protect the company and its business activity from shareholders. Within the framework of the US debate, one
might be inclined to group him with scholars defending the powerful
role of management.182 However, given the focus on public policy in
his second book, he should better be classified as close to social planners such as Berle after the New Deal. Nevertheless, it seems that this
aspect of his work was not the one that primarily influenced the debate among legal commentators advancing an institutional theory of
the corporation.
Among these, Haussmann was the first to address Rathenau’s
theories. He coined the term “Unternehmen an sich” and used it to
describe how he understood Rathenau,183 criticizing him and other
economic theorists, including John Maynard Keynes, who had suggested that large corporations tended towards “self-socialization” in a

181

RATHENAU, VON KOMMENDEN DINGEN, id., at 146-150; RATHENAU, IN DAYS TO
COME, id., at 124-128.
182
E.g. Stephan M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights,
53 UCLA L. REV. 601 (2006); contra Bebchuk, supra note 46, at 833.
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RIECHERS, supra note 96, at 16.
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lecture given in Berlin in 1926.184 Haussmann studied the major conflicts of interest within firms and argues that, while the interests of the
controlling shareholder typically coincide with that of the “business
in itself”, the main conflict being the one between large shareholders
and transient investors.185 His legal argument did not rest on the
“business in itself”, as he argued that the corporation was not an end
in itself, but on the “collective interest of shareholders.” He suggested
that shareholders were tied to this interest, which should be used to
provide the decisive balance in cases of conflicts.186
Other legal writers, however, viewed the concept of an independent interest of the corporation more favorably, such as Oskar
Netter, who espoused the theory of the Unternehmen an sich as a legal theory rooted in the real life of corporations.187 Shares held by the
firm’s management – a controversial issue during the Weimar Republic – should be deemed permissible unless they were not used to convey special advantages to the controllers to the detriment of the corporation.188 The use of voting rights by shareholders should be limited by the duty of loyalty, he argued, which is tied to the interest of
the corporation; the duty of loyalty thus implied recognition of the
principle of the “business in itself”.189 This interest should also be the
measure in majority-minority conflicts about the firm’s business policies,190 and in disputes about the extent to which the firm should be

184

JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, DAS ENDE DES LAISSEZ-FAIRE: IDEEN ZU VERBINDUNG VON PRIVAT- UND GEMEINWIRTSCHAFT 32-33 (1926); JOHN MAYNARD
KEYNES, THE END OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE 42-43 (1926) (German and English publication of this lecture); see HAUSSMANN, supra note 177, at 30. Keynes was in fact
describing the weak position of shareholders in large firms, in which case management was no longer promoting maximum profits for shareholders, but able to relegate them to receiving “adequate dividends.”
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HAUSSMANN, id., at 52-54.
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permitted to withhold dividends from distribution.191 Similarly,
Landsberger argued that the corporation had developed into an independent organization, thereby establishing the Unternehmen an sich
as a real-world fact to be reflected by the law.192 The business organized as a corporation was to be considered a purpose in itself, and
the underlying legal principle a factor needed to balance the interests
of “providers of capital, owners, proprietors of influence”, who “even
where they possess a majority, are pitted against the interest of the
totality of shareholders, which is recognized as a legal person by the
law.”193 Landsberger, who cited Gierke’s theory as a basis for his,
argued that the point of the theory is simply to emphasize the importance of the entirety of shareholders, as opposed to their individual
interests; stability of the corporation was the key, also in view of the
public significance of the firm.194
The Weimar period saw an intense discussion about the term
that extended beyond the handful of authors referred to here. While
the idea of managerial independence had adherents in socialist circles,
it served business interests as well. The hyperinflation period of following World War I had facilitated the acquisition of large ownership
shares and changes in the prevailing majorities due to the redistributive effects of inflation, and possibly because the prices of stocks did
not grow as fast as inflation.195 This helped in particular foreign acquirers, whose actions caused concern about excessive foreign influence.196 While the development of ownership structure during that
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Landsberger, id., at 86.
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Heinz-Dieter Assmann, in 1 GROSSKOMMENTAR AKTIENGESETZ, Einleitung,
comment 131 (Klaus J. Hopt & Herbert Wiedemann eds. 1992); LAUX, supra note
164, at 127.
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Curt Eduard Fischer, Rechtsschein und Wirklichkeit im Aktienrecht, 154 ARCHIV
FÜR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS 85, 101 (1955); Assmann, id.; Gerald Spindler,
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period is not clear,197 managers and controlling shareholders therefore
began to entrench their positions through by multiple-vote shares or
shares to a trustee of the corporation, typically banks, which increased
the influence of these institutions on industrial firms.198 Curt Fischer199, viewing the debate on the Unternehmen an sich in retrospect
after World War II, criticized the erosion of individual rights of
shareholders and disclosure duties, while divergences from the oneshare-one-vote principle increased, so that large shareholders’ became
more entrenched and powerful.200 The opinions voiced in the course
of the debate were highly diverse, and the same is true for its academic assessment in later decades. While some argued that its purpose
was to legitimize the power of managers and the group of shareholders supporting it,201 others suggested that the point was rather to empower directors, who had no particular interest in shareholder profits,
to advance “general economic concerns”.202
While all of these readings seem well-founded in some aspect
of the complex debate, for the objective of this article it is necessary
197

Caroline Fohlin, The History of Ownership and Control in Germany, in A HISCORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD 223, 229 (Randall K.
Morck ed. 2005).
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See e.g. Assmann, supra note 195, at 133; Fohlin, id., at 262-263; Spindler, id.
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1004. On Fischer’s biography see Werner Schubert, Einleitung zu Band I, in 1
AKADEMIE FÜR DEUTSCHES RECHT 1933-1945, PROTOKOLLE DER AUSSCHÜSSE:
AUSSCHUSS FÜR AKTIENRECHT XX, XXX n. 70 (Werner Schubert, Werner Schmid
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to focus on another one that seems not to have received a lot of attention, namely the role of ownership structure. To that end, it is necessary to distinguish Rathenau from the legal writers of the late 1920s
and 1930s, who had different objectives. Rathenau did not believe he
had much to say about corporate law and merely observed the separation of ownership and control, much as Berle and Means did in the
US. As Haussmann pointed out, Rathenau’s view was distorted by his
personal experience at AEG, while concentrated ownership prevailed
in most large German firms. His hope that autonomous large firms
would contribute to the development of his utopian world of tomorrow was therefore of little significance. However, with his managerial
background he was typical insofar as he voiced concern about shareholder decisions and requests, which set him sharply apart from the
later American debate. The German legal writers a decade later had a
similar concern that was unimportant in the Berle-Means world,
namely conflicts of interest between shareholders that apparently
were a lot more important in the German corporate world of that time
than in the US. These authors followed a “sociological” method of the
law, which viewed the law and the real world as mutually dependent.203 Thus, legal authors such as Netter204, Landsberger205 and Geiler206 argued that shareholders should be constrained in their decisionmaking by the interests of the business, understood as a separate entity from shareholders. The theory of the Unternehmen an sich, even
though it was not always explicitly referred to, was intended to constrain shareholders. Even Haussmann, who denied the independent
interest of the interest of the business (or of the firm) sought to limit
shareholder influence by tying them to the interest of the “entirety of
203

Karl Geiler, Die wirtschaftsrechtliche Methode im Gesellschaftsrecht, 68 BEITRÄGE ZUR ERLÄUTERUNG DES DEUTSCHEN RECHTS (GRUCHOTS BEITRÄGE) 592
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shareholders.”207 Given this difference in emphasis, Haussmann can
probably be classified as a shareholder primacist. Rathenau had maybe misunderstood the preeminent problems under the most common
type of ownership structure, and the goals of his initial sermon were
those of a practitioner. However, both he and later authors sought to
protect managerial power from shareholders, which stands in contrast
to the concern about managerial power emphasized by Berle and
Means.
The case law underwent a parallel development, in which the
Reichsgericht (Supreme Court) moved away from the majorityfocused understanding of power within the firm. In the 1927 “Hamburg-Süd” opinion, it gave its blessings to a shareholder decision to
increase the firm’s capital by issuing new multiple-vote shares to a
consortium controlled by the management and supervisory board
members, from which other shareholders were excluded.208 The effect
was effective entrenchment, given that only 25% of par value had to
be paid up front, while the outstanding stock traded at 220%.209 While
most of the court’s approval of the takeover defense (another bank
was threatening to take over the firm) is relentlessly positivistic,210
the opinion also declines that the structure could be contrary to public
policy, since there were good reasons why the firm should be protected from shareholders:
“It is obvious that the financial expansion and
protection of the corporation in particular are of decisive significance to secure its autonomy and independence, and that a blocking majority in its common
stock could endanger its viability and, in any case, the
207

Haussmann, supra note 186, at 64. Netter criticized Hausmann’s reliance on the
“collective interest” of shareholders as inappropriate, since the collective interest
could not be the sum of individual interests. Therefore, the only way would be to
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208
RGZ 119, 248.
209
RIECHERS, supra note 96, at 113.
210
The court emphasizes that none of the individual elements of this early takeover
protection was contrary to the law.

50

MARTIN GELTER

8/19/2010

beneficial continued development of the corporation…This is absolutely in line with other provisions
of the defendant firm’s articles, which obviously aim
at preserving the enterprise in itself and its autochthonous character while repelling shareholders’ interests.”211
Generally, the case law was moving towards putting more
limits on shareholders conduct in exercising their right to vote during
the 1920s. After describing the case law, a 1930 article summarized
the state of the law as follows:
“Nothing prevents a shareholder from letting
his own interests guide his vote. However, the ballot,
and thus the shareholder resolution, is against public
policy if the majority pursues selfish goals in a onesided way at the cost of the company, or at the cost of
the minority without this cost being necessitated by the
good of the company.”212
The intense Weimar Republic and early Nazi Germany debates about the reform of corporate law ultimately led to § 70 of the
1937 Aktiengesetz, which is often cited in the stakeholder debate. It
stated that the management board was required
“to manage the corporation as the good of the
enterprise and its retinue and the common wealth of
folk and realm demand.”213

211
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Most importantly,214 the reform turned the relationship between management and shareholders on its head. The management
board was charged by the law with the exclusive responsibility of
managing the company215, with unsolicited interference by the supervisory board or by shareholders not being legally binding.216 While
previously the meeting of shareholders had been the supreme controlling body,217 its role now became a comparatively limited one.218
Since 1937, the law requires the management board to be appointed
and dismissed by the supervisory board. A premature revocation of a
management board member requires cause (which could simply be a
shareholder vote of no confidence if it is not obviously abusive).219
Supervisory board members can only be dismissed prematurely by a
from the law in the 1965 reform. Raiser‘s proposal to translate “Gefolgschaft” as
“membership”, is highly questionable.. See Thomas Raiser, The Theory of Enterprise Law in the Federal Republic of Germany, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 111, 123 (1988).
214
RIECHERS, supra note 96, at 167 (suggesting that the practical importance of §
70 was close to zero compared to other reforms).
215
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216
Hans Joachim Mertens, in KÖLNER KOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESETZ, § 76,
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Reinier Kraakman et al. 2009); Luca Enriques, Gerard Hertig & Hideki Kanda,
Related Party Transactions, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 153, 176-178
(2nd ed., Reinier Kraakman et al. 2009).
219
§ 84(3) AktG.
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supermajority of three quarters in the shareholder meeting.220 Since
the reform, the shareholder meeting can legally only get involved in
management decisions when a decision is submitted for a vote by
management.221 Franz Schlegelberger, the leading official in the
German Ministry of Justice at the time of the reform, famously described the shareholder meeting as the “dethroned king” of the corporation.222
The extent to which the previous debate had influenced these
reforms has recently become a matter of dispute. According to the
traditional narrative that emerged after World War II, the 1937 Act
was the legislative conclusion of a broader current in a Weimar-era
legal and economic thought that had begun with Rathenau,223 although was also compatible with the Nazi Führerprinzip (leader principle), which exalted the role of the president of the management
board over other members.224 Even Fischer, who had opposed the
Unternehmen an sich during the 1930s,225 suggested that the idea of
the “leader principle” did not bring about too many new develop-

220

§ 103(1) AktG.
§ 119(2) AktG. Previously, the shareholder has been entitled to give instructions
to management under § 235 HGB.
222
FRANZ SCHLEGELBERGER, DIE ERNEUERUNG DES DEUTSCHEN AKTIENRECHTS 28
(1935). Schlegelberger served as the Third Reich’s minister of justice in 1941/42
and served some years in prison after the war. See also E. Geßler, Vorstand und
Aufsichtsrat im neuen Aktienrecht, 66 JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 497, 497
(1937) (pointing out that previously large shareholders and banks had ensured that
the shareholder meetings had the desired content).
223
E.g. BRUNO KROPFF, AKTIENGESETZ 13 (1965) (official report on the 1965
reform); Vagts, supra note 213, at 48; Knut Wolfgang Nörr, Zur Entwicklung des
Aktien- und Konzernrechts während der Weimarer Republik, 150 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
DAS GESAMTE HANDELS- UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 155, 161 (1986); RIECHERS,
supra note 96, at 166; DIRK BAHRENFUSS, DIE ENTSTEHUNG DES AKTIENGESETZES
VON 1965, 45 (2001); SUSANNE KALSS, CHRISTINA BURGER & GEORG ECKERT, DIE
ENTWICKLUNG DES ÖSTERREICHISCHEN AKTIENRECHTS 320 (2003).
224
See Jan von Hein, Vom Vorstandvorsitzenden zum CEO? 166 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
DAS GESAMTE HANDELS- UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 464, 475 (2002).
225
Fischer, Führerprinzip, supra note 199, at 29.
221
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ments, but rather in a codification of the corporate practice of several
decades.226
Interestingly, American law was one of the sources of inspiration for German policymakers after the Nazi takeover: Johannes
Zahn, who had completed an S.J.D. degree at Harvard Law School,227
criticized the theory of the “Unternehmen an sich” for carrying Marxist thought into private law,228 but nevertheless proposed the powerful
position of the board in the US as the basis for German reform in his
1934 book in order to restructure the relationship between shareholders and directors in Germany. Like their American counterparts,
German directors should become leaders of a business organism independent from changing majorities among shareholders.229 Zahn,
who spoke before the corporate law reform committee’s work in
1934,230 agreed with the plan to strengthen the role of management,
as he was personally close to banking and business circles.231
226

Fischer, supra note 196, at 109.
According to the title page of the book. In the preface he reports having worked
as “scientific assistant at the Seminar for Comparative Private Law of Harvard
University.”
228
JOHANNES C. D. ZAHN, WIRTSCHAFTSFÜHRERTUM UND VERTRAGSETHIK IM
NEUEN AKTIENRECHT. ANREGUNGEN ZUM NEUBAU DES DEUTSCHEN AKTIENRECHTS
AUF GRUND EINER VERGLEICHENDEN DARSTELLUNG DES DEUTSCHEN UND NORDAMERIKANISCHEN AKTIENRECHTS 39 (1934).
229
ZAHN, id., at 94. While Zahn emphasized that American law, not having been
influenced by Roman law, was based on “Teutonic” legal principles, he suggested
that the strong position of directors in the US stems from the idea of liberty of the
individual (as businessman), a precept that entirely differed from what was considered “German” at that time. ZAHN, id., at 13, 201 passim. However, Zahn also
discussed Dodge v. Ford in great detail and concluded that managers should act to
the benefit of shareholders (id., at 41-48). The Berle-Dodd exchange apparently
came too late to be included in his book.
230
Schubert, supra note 199, at XLVII (thanking Ernst Geßler, one of the leading
drafters of both the 1937 and 1965 acts, for bringing this to his attention); von Hein,
supra note 224, at 476; contra Bernd Mertens, Das Aktiengesetz von 1937 – unpolitischer Schlussstein oder ideologischer Neuanfang? 29 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR NEUERE
RECHTSGESCHICHTE 88, 98 n.54 (2007). Mertens argues that the pre-1945 sources
do not support the claim of Zahn’s influence, and that German law moved even
further away from the US board system by inhibiting the supervisory board’s involvement in management. It is true that Zahn recognized that the ideological basis
of managerial leadership was different in the US. However, von Hein (id., at 476)
227
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In a recent article, Bernd Mertens doubts the received wisdom
and argues that the reforms were not the logical continuation of a previous development, but rather an ideological new beginning.232 He
suggests that the reason for the preponderant view (according to
which Nazi ideology was merely reflected by some of the language of
the law) was that scholars and policymakers sought to distance themselves from that period.233 He is of course right in pointing out that
the 1930 draft for a new corporate law did not include the provisions
discussed here,234 and that the discussion about the Unternehmen an
sich doctrine remained controversial.235 However, even Hjalmar
Schacht, the Minister of Industry, opposed the most extreme proposals that might have implemented a completely authoritarian Führerprinzip, which would have eliminated any residual shareholder control. Schacht conceded that large firms needed to obtain capital,
which would not be possible without at least limited shareholder influence.236
correctly points out that ZAHN (id., at 17) considered the “leader principle” to be a
fixture of American corporate law and that his participation in committee meetings
is proven by the minutes. He presented his case before the corporate law committee
of the Academy of German law on February 9, 1934. While he did not explicitly
refer to American law, he proposed to make management independent from shareholders in order to allow the “average investor” to see management as “the entrepreneur”, and to establish a clearer duty of loyalty between shareholders. See AKADEMIE FÜR DEUTSCHES RECHT, supra note 199, at 60-65 (transcript of the meeting).
231
RIECHERS, supra note 96, at 159.
232
Mertens, supra note 230, at 91-108.
233
Mertens, id., at 115.
234
Reichsjustizministrerium, Entwurf eines Gesetzes über Aktiengesellschaften und
Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien, reprinted in 2 QUELLEN ZUR AKTIENRECHTSREFORM DER WEIMARER REPUBLIK (1926-1931) 847 (Werner Schubert ed. 1999).
235
An overview is provided by RIECHERS, supra note 96, at 154-169.
236
Walter Bayer & Sylvia Engelke, Die Revision des Aktienrechts durch das Aktiengesetz von 1937, in 1 AKTIENRECHT IM WANDEL 619, notes 49-52 (Walter Bayer & Mathias Habersack eds. 2007) (citing Schacht’s speech held before the Academy for German Law on November 30, 1935); but see Peter Doralt, Die Unabhängigkeit des Vorstands nach österreichischem und deutschen Aktienrecht – Schein
und Wirklichkeit, in DIE GESTALTUNG DER ORGANISATIONSDYNAMIK. FESTSCHRIFT
FÜR OSKAR GRÜN 31, 37 (Werner H. Hoffmann ed. 2003) (suggesting that the
draftsmen only paid lip service to the Führerprinzip and implemented a program
skeptical of capitalism, particularly anonymously held capital).
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The 1937 reform also addressed dividends, which had been
the subject of the famous controversy between the Dodge brothers
and Henry Ford in the US and was also widely debated in Germany.
The reform transferred the authority to approve the annual accounts
from shareholders to the management and supervisory boards by allowing the two bodies to jointly decide to create retained earnings in
the balance sheet, and thus to curb shareholders’ “hunger for dividends.”237 In the US, Henry Ford’s predicament of being forced to
pay dividends was and is unusual, given that the decision by default
lies with the board of directors.238 As such, it is normally protected by
the business judgment rule and not usually liable to attack as selfdealing, given that all shareholders participate pro rata.239 True, retention of profits within the firm is only beneficial if it has good projects
to invest in. However, participants in the German debate displayed
strong concerns about the risk of management being forced to make a
distribution at an inconvenient time, which sometimes disrupts for
business planning.240
The overall emerging picture of the debate is that German
analysts of the interwar period were strongly concerned with the presence of different shareholder groups, changing majorities, and controlling shareholders, which was not much of a concern in American
“Berle-Means” type corporations. The Unternehmen an sich debate
reacted partly to this. Stakeholder concerns and employee interests
seem to have entered the German debate primarily as a result of the
enactment of § 70. In an influential treatise, Schlegelberger and other
senior officials of the Ministry of Justice suggest that the “retinue” of
237

Hefermehl, Die Rechnungslegung im neuen Aktiengesetz, 66 JURISTISCHE WO503, 503 (1937) (“In other firms, the shareholder meeting confirmed
financial statements that stood in blatant contrast to the proposals of the administration. This did not happen because shareholders considered different financial statements to be correct because they had better expertise, but exclusively because they
desired a personal advantage, while remaining indifferent towards the fate of the
firm”); see Fischer, supra note 196, at 99; KALSS ET AL., supra note 223, at 318. On
the debate before the 1965 act, when the concern was the lack of capital of German
firms, see Kropff, supra note 244, note 65.
238
§ 170(1) DGCL (providing that directors may declare dividends).
239
See e.g. Kamin v. American Express Co., 54 A.D.2d 654 (N.Y. 1976).
240
Supra note 237.
CHENSCHRIFT
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the enterprise is intended to refer to employees, whose wellbeing the
members of the management board must take care of.241 But of
course, keeping the common good of folk and realm in mind was the
preponderant objective among all, thereby integrating the firm into
the policy framework of the national economy.242

4.3.

Post-War reception

The Aktiengesetz 1937 remained in place in Western Germany after the end of World War II without any significant changes.243
With the exception of the default provision that the chairman of the
management board could decide alone in the case of disagreements,244 the reforms were retained after the war. As Bruno Kropff
(one of the leading drafters of the subsequent 1965 reform) points out,
by that time the distribution of competences between shareholders
and the two boards had by and large come to be considered appropriate.245 Thus, it seems safe to say that in spite of its ideological component, much of the substance of the act must have seemed defensible
on policy grounds. While it was debated whether shareholders should
again be granted the power to get involved in business decisions, the
distribution of competences according to the 1937 reform was still
considered adequate.246 A 2003 article echoes this view by explaining
why the limited role of the shareholder meeting and the legal entrenchment of the board of directors are considered mandatory law:
“[T]he corporate constitution set out in the Aktiengesetz is seen as an optimal guarantee, on the one
hand, for serving the public economic interest in a
well-functioning enterprise, and, on the other hand, for
241

FRANZ SCHLEGELBERGER, LEO QUASSOWSKI, GUSTAV HERBIG, ERNST GESSLER
& WOLFGANG HEFERMEHL, AKTIENGESETZ, § 70, comments 6, 7 (3rd ed. 1939).
242
SCHLEGELBERGER ET AL., id., comment 8.
243
E.g. Mertens, supra note 230, at 110.
244
See Bruno Kropff, Reformbestrebungen im Nachkriegsdeutschland und die Aktienrechtsreform von 1965, in 1 AKTIENRECHT IM WANDEL 670, note 57 (Walter
Bayer & Mathias Habersack eds. 2007).
245
Kropff, id., note 60
246
Kropff, id.
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protecting the interests of current and future shareholders (against management, and, if they exist, large
shareholders) and of creditors (against management
and shareholders).”247
Notably, the German reform of 1965 partly reversed the 1937
decision regarding dividends and required 50% of profits to be distributed if the financial statements were approved by the supervisory
board (and thus not submitted to a shareholder vote).248
While employee interests had not been the focus of the debate
of the 1920s, this gradually changed in the post-War Federal Republic. Scholars tended to distance themselves from the concept of Unternehmen an sich, but instead focused on the Unternehmensinteresse
(the interest of the enterprise) concept of § 70. While no uniform interpretation of the term has ever emerged, post-war scholarship continued to understand the enterprise or the corporation to be distinct
from shareholder interests.249 The first post-War edition of a leading
treatise of German corporate law emphasized how the reform led to
an insulation of management from shareholders and argued that the
independent responsibility of the management board
“is not an alien contaminant in corporate law
resulting from faulty national socialist economic
thought. This provision rather takes into account a development of the structure of business, particularly the
big enterprise in its macroeconomic and social importance, which is by no means restricted to the domain of
corporate law in Germany. Even though one might
deplore that particularly corporate law and the practice
of large firms – even before the reform of 1937 – is
moving more towards the “business in itself” […], this
development cannot be stopped and will lead to a cer247

Doralt, supra note 236, at 40.
§ 58 AktG.
249
But see Fischer, supra note 196, at 101-106; see also RIECHERS, supra note 96,
at 1 (noting in the introduction to his 1996 book that the term “Unternehmen an
sich” is still popular).
248
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tain reduction of shareholders’ role as formal owners.”250
The general idea of the “good of the enterprise” survived the
enactment of a new Aktiengesetz in 1965 at least in some form, when
the old § 70 was replaced by a new § 76 that merely reiterated the
board’s independence (much like DGCL § 141(a)), but was devoid of
an explicit goal. However, the legislative report made it clear that no
change in the law was intended;251 in fact, it pointed out that it was
self-evident that managers would have to take capital, employee and
public interests into account.252 In its decision declaring the 1976 codetermination act to be constitutional, the German constitutional court
gave support to this view by stating that ownership of stocks was subject to “social restrictions.”253
The new, expansive codetermination law of 1976254 may have
further fueled arguments in favor of what we today call a stakeholderoriented interpretation of the law, but corresponding academic writing
250

Walter Schmidt & Joachim Meyer-Landrut, § 70, comment 1, in 1 AKTIENGEGROSSKOMMENTAR (Carl Hans Barz, Robert Fischer, Ulrich Klug, Konrad
Mellerowicz, Joachim Meyer-Landrut, Wolfgang Schilling & Walter Schmidt 2nd.
ed. 1961) (own translation).
251
See e.g. Joachim Meyer-Landrut, § 76, comment 9, in 1 AKTIENGESETZ GROSSKOMMENTAR (Carl Hans Barz, Herbert Bröner, Ulrich Klug, Konrad Mellerowicz,
Joachim Meyer-Landrut, Wolfgang Schilling, Herbert Wiedemann & Hans
Würdinger, 3rd. ed. 1973).
252
See the official reasoning for the proposal in KROPFF, supra note 223, at 97. For
an overview of the development of the rule see Vagts, supra note 213, at 40-41; cf.
Mertens, supra note 216, § 76, comment 16 (stating that the language of the 1937
act was still relevant; Klaus J. Hopt, Aktionärskreis und Vorstandsneutralität, 22
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 534, 536 (1993).
However, some authors did not agree with this interpretation. See e.g. Wolfgang
Hefermehl, in 2 AKTIENGESETZ, § 76, comment 20 (Ernst Geßler, Wolfgang Hefermehl, Ulrich Eckardt & Bruno Kropff eds. 1973, 1974) (suggesting that no such
requirement exists). The German law’s Austrian offshoot to this day explicitly requires the management board to pursue the good of the enterprise while having
regard to the interests of stockholders, employees and the public interest (§ 70 Austrian AktG of 1965).
253
BVerfGE 50, 290, 315 f “Mitbestimmung”.
254
MITBESTIMMUNGSGESETZ, BGBl. I 1976, S. 1153.
SETZ
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began to develop earlier. Legal scholars writing in the 1960s and
1970s increasingly adopted a sociological theory of corporate law, in
which the Unternehmensinteresse was traced to the idea that the enterprise constitutes a social collective.255 The corporation was seen as
an amalgamation of the interests of owners, workers and managers,256
the proper goal of which was to maintain the existence of the firm,
taking the interests of various groups into account257, and to maintain
its long-term earning power.258 In that view, it is in the discretion of
the management board to pursue other goals, such as fulfilling consumer demand, providing adequate wages and working conditions,
255

THOMAS RAISER, DAS UNTERNEHMEN ALS ORGANISATION 133-157 (1969);
Thomas Raiser, Das Unternehmensinteresse, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR REIMER SCHMIDT
101, 117 (Fritz Reichert-Facilides, Fritz Rittner, Jürgen Sasse eds. 1976); see also
Wolfgang Schilling, Das Aktienunternehmen, 144 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS GESAMTE
HANDELS- UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 136 (1980); contra Fritz Rittner, Aktiengesellschaft oder Aktienunternehmen? 144 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS GESAMTE HANDELSUND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 330, 330-334 (1980); WERNER FLUME, UM EIN NEUES
UNTERNEHMENSRECHT (1980).
256
Wolfgang Zöllner, Einleitung, in KÖLNER KOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESETZ,
EINLEITUNGS-BAND, comment 130 (1st ed., Wolfgang Zöllner ed. 1984) (pointing
out that the continued existence of old, unproductive firms serves no one); Michael
Kort, in 19 GROSSKOMMENTAR AKTG § 76, comment 53 (Klaus J. Hopt & Herbert
Wiedemann eds. 2003); Wulf Goette, Leitung, Aufsicht, Haftung – zur Rolle der
Rechtsprechung bei der Sicherung einer modernen Unternehmensführung, IN FESTSCHRIFT AUS ANLASS DES FÜNFZIGJÄHRIGEN BESTEHENS VON BUNDESGERICHTSHOF, BUNDESANWALTSCHAFT UND RECHTSANWALTSCHAFT BEIM BUNDESGERICHTSHOF 123, 127 (Karlmann Geiß, Kay Nehm, Hans Erich Brandner & Horst
Hagen eds. 2000).
257
Zöllner, id., note 256, comment 136; Hopt, supra note 252, at 536-537; Klaus J.
Hopt, Übernahmen, Geheimhaltung und Interessenkonflikte: Problem für Vorstände, Aufsichtsräte und Banken, 31 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 333, 359-360 (2002).
258
FRITZ RITTNER, WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT § 9, note 15 (2nd ed. 1987); Mertens, supra
note 216, § 76, comments 10, 22-23; Kort, supra note 256, § 76, comment 51;
Spindler, supra note 216, § 76, comment 61; Goette, supra note 256, at 127; THOMAS RAISER & RÜDIGER VEIL, DAS RECHT DER KAPITALGESELLSCHAFTEN § 14,
comment 13 (4th ed. 2006) (mentioning the management board’s duty to “increase”
shareholder value as one of several tasks); HÜFFER, supra note 216, § 76, comment
13. It is interesting to note that this interpretation of the law seems to correspond to
John Kenneth Galbraith’s descriptions of what managers in large firms do in fact.
See GALBRAITH, supra note 23, at 153 passim.
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the relationship to the firm’s social and cultural environment, the
maintenance of a livable environment, and macroeconomic concerns.259 Profits must be made in an amount that suffices to maintain
the firm.260 During this period, confidence in the German corporate
governance system was as its peak, and Germany even strove to export some of its core elements to the European level, e.g. by means of
the proposed 5th EEC Company Law Directive, which would have
required the introduction of worker representation across the continent.261 The project failed, not the least due to resistance from UK
after the introduction of employee representation had failed within the
domestic debate in Britain.262 A contrarian movement developed only
during the 1990s, apparently under the influence of US scholarship
and an increasing significance of capital markets and institutional
investors. As a result, the idea of “shareholder value” became part of
the debate.263 Unsurprisingly, the growing attractiveness of a share259

Mertens, supra note 216, § 76, comment 11.
Mertens, id., § 76, comment 22-23; JOHANNES SEMLER, LEITUNG UND ÜBERWAnd
CHUNG DER AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT, comments 38, 48 (2 ed. 1996); contra Peter
Raisch, Zum Begriff und zur Bedeutung des Unternehmensinteresses als Verhaltensmaxime von Vorstands- und Aufsichtsratsmitgliedern, in STRUKTUREN UND
ENTWICKLUNGEN IM HANDELS-, GESELLSCHAFTS- UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT, FESTSCHRIFT FÜR WOLFGANG HEFERMEHL 348, 352, 363 (Robert Fischer, Ernst Geßler,
Wolfgang Schilling, Rolf Serick & Peter Ulmer eds. 1976) (suggesting that maintaining the firm’s legal capital suffices).
261
See e.g. J. Temple Lang, The Fifth EEC Directive on the Harmonization of
Company Law, Part 2, 2 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 345, 346-349 (1975).
262
VANESSA EDWARDS, EC COMPANY LAW 388 (1999). The governmentcommissioned “Bullock Report” recommended the introduction of a mandatory
employee participation system similar to the German one, but the project had only
limited support even within the Labour movement and was ultimately abandoned
when Margaret Thatcher came to power in 1980. See LORD BULLOCK (CHAIRMAN),
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY ON INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY (1977) (official report recommending employee participation): David Marsh & Gareth Locksley, Capital in Britain: Its Structural Power and Influence over Policy, WEST EUR.
POL., March 1983, at 36, 49-50 (discussing the failure of the proposal).
263
Manfred Groh, Shareholder Value und Aktienrecht, 42 DER BETRIEB 2153
(2000); Spindler, supra note 216, § 76, comments 66-68; Peter O. Mülbert, Shareholder Value aus rechtlicher Sicht, 26 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESELLSCHAFTS- UND UNTERNEHMENSRECHT 129 (1997); Friedrich Kübler, Shareholder Value: Eine Herausforderung für das Deutsche Recht? in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR WOLFGANG ZÖLLNER 321
260
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holder primacy goal264 coincided with mounting criticism of codetermination.265

4.4. An unusual practical application: The Mannesmann
case
In spite of its long pedigree, the reception of the Unternehmensinteresse (“interest of the business”) doctrine by the courts can at
best be called ambiguous. The courts use the concept or equivalent
ones frequently, but typically without defining it or striking a balance
between shareholder and stakeholder interests, e.g. when discussing
whether the exclusion of a preemptive right is justified “in the interest
of the firm”, 266 or when defining the duties of board members.267 Un-

(Manfred Lieb, Ulrich Noack & H.P. Westermann eds. 1998); Axel von Werder,
Shareholder Value-Ansatz als (einzige) Richtschnur des Vorstandshandelns? 27
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESELLSCHAFTS- UND UNTERNEHMENSRECHT 69 (1998); contra
HÜFFER, supra note 216, § 76, comment 12a-12b (rejecting shareholder value and
espousing a stakeholder conception).
264
Kübler, id.; Groh, id., at 2158; Klaus J. Hopt & Markus Roth, in GROSSKOMth
th
MENTAR AKTIENGESETZ, § 111, comment 104 (4 ed. 24 installment, Klaus J.
Hopt & Herbert Wiedemann ed. 2005); Holger Fleischer, in 1 KOMMENTAR ZUM
AKTIENGESETZ, § 76, comment 34 (Gerald Spindler & Eberhard Stiltz 2007).
265
E.g. Axel von Werder, Modernisierung der Mitbestimmung, 64 DIE BETRIEBSWIRTSCHAFT 229 (2004); Eberhard Schwark, Globalisierung, Europarecht und
Unternehmensmitbestimmung im Konflikt, 2004 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 173;
Michael Adams, Das Ende der Mitbestimmung, 2006 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT (ZIP) 1561.
266
Under German case law, a substantive reason that is potentially subject to judicial review is required to deprive shareholder of their statutory preemptive right.
See BGH March 13, 1978, II ZR 142/76, BGHZ 71, 40 (“Kali+Salz”); BGH April
19, 1982, II ZR 55/81, BGHZ 83, 319; BGH June 23, 1997, II ZR 132/93, BGHZ
136, 133 (“Siemens/Nold”); see also OLG Stuttgart 12.8.1998, 20 U 111/97, DB
1998, 1757; OLG Braunschweig July 29, 1998, 3 U 75/98, ZIP 1998, 1585; BGH
November 21, 2005, 2006 WERTPAPIER-MITTEILUNGEN 432; BGH March 7, 1994,
II ZR 52/93, BGHZ 125, 239 (discussing whether a company should seek a foreign
stock exchange listing); see also BGH February 8, 1988, II ZR 159/87, BGHZ 103,
213, 217 (using the interest of the association as an argument why the company
should be represented by the supervisory board instead of management board in a
court procedure about the removal of members of the management board).
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der the Takeover Law implementing the 2004 EU directive, takeover
defenses are permitted when they were approved by shareholders and
permitted in the company’s charter,268 and the supervisory and management must act in the “interest of the target company,”269 i.e. the
Unternehmensinteresse.270
The one recent case where the doctrine was at least of superficial significance was Mannesmann, resulting from the first openly
hostile takeover bid for a German firm,271 launched by Vodafone Airtouch of the UK in 2000. Mannesmann’s management abandoned its
defenses, the cost of which had gone into the hundreds of millions of
Deutschmarks,272 after Vodafone had raised its bid price from € 240
to € 360.273 The supervisory board then decided to grant “appreciation
awards” to the members of the management board, most of all an
amount of € 16 Million to CEO Klaus Esser, who had been in this
position for less than a year, in addition to his contractual severance
payment of € 15 Million.274 Other management board members, some
of whom had been members for only a few days and left the firm a
few months after the decision, also received substantial sums. These
awards “in recognition for their contribution to the firm’s success”
had in fact been suggested by Mannesmann’s 10% shareholder, Hut267

BGH June 5, 1975, BGHZ 64, 325, 331, NJW 1975, 1412 (duty of confidentiality); see also BGH February 25, 1982, BGHZ 83, 144 (briefly mentioning that the
board should remain operational in the interest of the business); see also BVerfG
March 1, 1979, 1 BvR 532, 533/72, 419 and 41 BvR 21/71, BVerfGE 50, 290, 374
(Constitutional Court approving the 1976 codetermination regime and mentioning
the obligation of board members to pursue the interest of the enterprise in passing).
268
§ 33a WpÜG.
269
§ 3(3) WpÜG.
270
E.g. Kai Haakon Liekefett, Bietergleichbehandlung bei öffentlichen Übernahmeangeboten, 50 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 802, 806-810 (2005) (discussing what
the concept could imply in the takeover context).
271
E.g. Cheffins, supra note 6, at 502.
272
Cf. Mark Binz & Martin Sorg, Esser und Ackermann müssen Pyrrhussiege
fürchten, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, May 6, 2004, at 12 (reporting costs
of € 432 Million).
273
See Franklin A. Gevurtz, Disney in a Comparative Light, 55 AM. J. COMP. L.
453, 460 (2007).
274
Stefan Maier, A Close Look at the Mannesmann Trial, 7 GERMAN L. J. 603, 604
(2006).
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chinson Whampoa of Hong Kong, which benefited from the sale financially275 and had previously offered to make such a payment.276
Since the bonus gave the appearance of a bribe to many observers,277 it sparked outrage in the press and among employees.278 In
2003, Mr. Esser and members of Mannesmann’s supervisory board
were indicted for Untreue (disloyalty), a criminal offense punishing
the abuse of the power to depose over someone else’s property or to
legally bind someone else.279 Defendants, including the former president of the board, Deutsche Bank CEO Josef Ackermann, claimed
that such payments were in accordance with international practices.
The employee representatives on the supervisory board, who had acquiesced to the payments without giving their assent, were also indicted.280 Law professors commented in the business press, most
prominently Marcus Lutter and Wolfgang Zöllner, who pointed out
that “the management board must secure the corporation’s position in
the market and increase profits.” Shareholders had benefited from the
higher bid price in consequence of the board’s defensive efforts, but
the firm (which ceased to exist) itself had not. In this view, their actions violated their duty to advance the interest of the firm.281 Others
explained that the gains in stock price were only a temporary result of
275

Peter Kolla, The Mannesmann Trial and the Role of the Courts, 5 GERMAN L. J.
829, 833 (2004); CURTIS MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW AND CAPITALISM
70 (2008).
276
Mark K. Binz & Martin Sorg, Ackermann & Co.: Gutsherren oder Gutsverwalter? BETRIEBS-BERATER, February 6, 2006, at I; MILHAUPT & PISTOR, id., at 70.
277
Kolla, supra note 275, at 833.
278
Gevurtz, supra note 273, at 461; MILHAUPT & PISTOR id., at 70-71.
279
§ 266 StGB (GERMANY). A typical case of Untreue would be a property manager who uses rent payments to gamble instead of passing them on to the owner, but
the offense is also relevant in the corporate context. See Pierre-Henri Conac, Luca
Enriques & Martin Gelter, Constraining Dominant Shareholders’ Self-Dealing: The
Legal Framework in France, Germany, and Italy, 4 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV.
491, 520 (2007).
280
MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 275, at 70-71.
281
Marcus Lutter & Wolfgang Zöllner, “Die Mannesmann-Prämien durften nicht
gezahlt werden“, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, February 10, 2004, at 12;
see also FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, March 19, 2004, at 14 (citing criminal law scholar Bernd Schünemann as saying that the board’s actions were punishable under criminal law).
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the takeover offer: The main beneficiary of the defenses was Hutchinson, whereas Vodafone subsequently wrote off the purchase price (to
the detriment of German taxpayers), and thousands of jobs were
lost.282
The initial trial resulted in an acquittal, but on appeal, the
German Federal Supreme Court (BGH) sided with the prosecution. In
its opinion, the BGH only paid lip service to the concept of Unternehmensinteresse, but applied a more specific statute that requires
management compensation to be reasonable.283 In the eyes of the
court, this was not the case here, since the bonus was neither based on
a prior contractual stipulation, nor could it be understood to generate
future benefits such as an incentive effect for managers given the impending breakup of the firm. Thus, the court found that the decision
to make the payment violated the duty of loyalty. The defendants ultimately reached a settlement with prosecutors, in the course of which
they agreed to pay substantial fines without having to admit guilt.284
In spite of the court’s rhetorical embrace of an institutional
understanding of the corporation, in which it reiterated that the interests of the totality of shareholders, of creditors and the public are relevant for concept of the welfare of the “business”, the reference to
the Unternehmensinteresse was superfluous. The court could easily
have reached the same result by referring to any definition of the best
“interests of the company”, including one taking only shareholder
wealth into account. The best analogy in US corporate would be the
waste doctrine.285 It is telling that even employee representatives on
282

Binz & Sorg, supra note 276, at I.
BGH December 21, 2005, BGHST 50, 331. The statute referred to is § 87(1),
sentence 1 AktG.
284
Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins, Martin Gelter, Hwa-Jin Kim, Richard Nolan,
Mathias Siems & Linia Prava Law Firm, Legal Liability of Directors and Company
Officials Part 2: Court Procedures, Indemnification and Insurance, and Administrative and Criminal Liability (Report to the Russian Securities Agency), 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 145-146.
285
See also Gevurtz, supra note 273, at 464 (“Essentially, this is the same as a
waste claim in the United States”). Gevurtz‘ suggestion conclusion that this shows
that German courts are less deferential to business decisions therefore seems premature. Fleischer, id., at 543. See also Maier, supra note 274 (“Contrary to popular
opinion, the BGH’s verdict in the Mannesmann trial makes no statement as to the
283
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the board did not object to the payment: At the time of the decision,
the breakup of the company (and layoffs) had already become inevitable.286 Furthermore, contradicting its professed adherence to an understanding of the corporation transcending shareholder interests, the
court stated that the board’s actions would not have led to a criminal
conviction if all shareholders had approved them, and not only Vodafone, which held 9.8% when the decision was made, and 98.6% at the
time of the payment.287

4.5. Conclusion: Institutionalism as an attempt to constrain shareholder power
In spite of recent criticism,288 we can still discern the imprint
of an institutional understanding of the corporation in German law.
Commentators typically see the Unternehmensinteresse as a proxy for
the interests of various groups that must be reconciled.289 Its practical
significance is rather doubtful, given that courts are usually able to
skirt clear definitions. Historically, the debate around 1930 was primarily concerned with the institutional construction of the firm. The
legal theory of the Unternehmen an sich was partly intended as a constraint on the conduct of shareholders, who were thought to be able to
often exert a detrimental influence on the firm. Other than in the US,
managerial power could not simply be taken for granted given the
complications in the corporate governance system created by nonatomistic share ownership patterns. Thus, participants in the German
appropriateness of executive remuneration.”) and id., at 606 (rejecting the argument
that non-contractual appreciation awards could be justified by the extra effort of
defending against hostile takeovers to achieve a high price).
286
MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 275, at 80.
287
MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 275, at 73; see Gevurtz, supra note 273, at 484
288
E.g. Fleischer, supra note 264, § 76, comments 30-31; see also Philipp Klages,
The Contractual Turn: How Legal Academics Shaped Corporate Law Reforms in
Germany, at http://www.mpifg.de/people/kg/downloads/Contractual%20Turn.pdf,
at 11-16; Roth, supra note 31, at 64 (both identifying a shift towards a contractual
understanding of the corporation and a shareholder primacy objective in legal scholarship).
289
HÜFFER, supra note 216, § 76, comment 15.
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debate struggled with intra-shareholder conflicts, for the resolution of
which an institutional understanding of the firm was intended to provide benchmarks. As far as the concept was intended to serve the
public interest (e.g. in the context of the 1937 statute), the intention
was clearly to shift the balance of powers between shareholders and
management in favor of the latter in order to reduce the scope of financially motivated decision-making. Nevertheless, the practical effects of the theory contemporary German corporate law seem to be
limited.

5.

French institutionalism and the “intérêt social”

France shares two traits with Germany that are interesting for
this article’s thesis: First, France is also often said to have a corporate
governance system not primarily intended to serve shareholder interests, but also those of employees and others, and the public interest in
general. France does not have codetermination, the reason probably
being that the tradition of dirigisme, meaning that the government
often intervenes in the economy, partly through direct ownership of
large businesses.290 Like Germany, France developed a strong “institutional school” of corporate law, which focused on the doctrine of
the intérêt social or intérêt de la société (interest of the association or
corporation), which is usually understood to take the interests of other
non-shareholder constituencies into account.291 The second feature
France shares with Germany is concentrated ownership, and I argue
that the impact it had on shareholder-stakeholder debates was similar,
while the tradition of state ownership appears not to feature prominently.
Section 5.1 describes the academic debates from which the
French institutional school developed. Section 5.2 looks at the role
specific legal rules and cases. Section 5.3 looks at rules relating to the
290

E.g. James A. Fanto, The Role of Corporate Law in the Adaptation of French
Enterprises, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 97, 100-103.
291
E.g. PHILIPPE MERLE & ANNE FAUCHON, DROIT COMMERCIAL. SOCIETES COMth
MERCIALES, para. 52-1 (13 ed. 2009); Christiane Alcouffe, Judges and CEOs :
French Aspects of Corporate Governance, 9 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 127, 133 (2000).
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removal of directors, which counteract a strong independent position
of the firm. Section 5.4 concludes.

5.1.

The origins of the French institutional school

The contemporary institutional school can trace its roots to the
1930s and developed vigorously during the 1960s. The first to develop an “institutional theory” of the corporation was Gaillard in his
1932 dissertation. He observed the growing number of small investors, but at the same time the possibility that financial groups could
easily obtain the majority of shares. Small shareholders would remain
passive, while a financial group, if not restrained by the law, could
use the power of the shareholder meeting to dominate the company.292 In his view, a contractual theory could not adequately address
abuses, as it presumed that minority shareholders had voluntarily
submitted to majority control, which is why courts would normally
not interfere with majority decisions (except maybe under a theory of
good faith).293 As a legal solution, he proposed an institutional theory,
in which the corporation was to be understood as the subject of its
own interest, the intérêt social; corporate decisions by managers, but
also shareholder votes, should be subject to judicial review under this
standard.294
The emergence of the institutional theory in the early 1930s
may have been influenced by contemporary economic developments,
as a result of which the significance of controlling shareholders had
grown. As in Germany, multiple-vote shares had been increasingly
used in French publicly traded companies during the 1920s. Following a period of high inflation around 1926, French companies sought
means to protect themselves against takeovers, particularly by foreign

292

EMILE GAILLARD, LA THEORIE INSTITUTIONNELLE ET LE FONCTIONNEMENT DE LA
SOCIETE ANONYME 10-13 (1932).
293
GAILLARD, id., at 14-20.
294
GAILLARD, id., at 36-43. Gaillard’s theory was not only normative, but to a large
degree descriptive, as he attempt to explain the existing French case law on its basis. See GAILLARD, id., at 33-36.
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investors.295 Volatile majorities that created difficulties for management were increasingly seen as a problem,296 and it was increasingly
thought that anti-takeover protections were needed to keep French
firms viable in international competition.297
Georges Ripert, a leading French business law scholar of the
th
mid-20 century, endorsed an institutional theory of the firm in his
1946 book, arguing that shareholders were abandoning their status as
an owner, taking a position similar to that of a creditor. His book
paints a picture of corporations resembling American firms with
strong management and apathetic shareholders, whose passivity no
corporate law reform has managed to overcome.298 Like American
scholars of his period, he recognized the “enterprise” as a de facto
entity, despite the law’s emphasis on shareholder democracy.299
While Ripert did not ignore the concerns of workers, he also did not
consider them to be an issue of concern of corporate law and objected
to codetermination.300 Employment law, on the other hand, ensured
that labor was no longer put to the service of capital and was, according to Ripert, already on the way towards effectively giving employees property right in their jobs by virtue of legal limits on dismissals.301

295

Muriel Petit-Konczyk, Big changes in ownership structures – Multiple votes in
interwar France, WORKING PAPER 11, at http://ssrn.com/abstract=944808.
296
ROQUEFORT-VILLENEUVE, LES ACTIONS A VOTE PLURAL AU POINT DE VUE ECONOMIQUE 33-58, 59-77 (1932).
297
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298
GEORGES RIPERT, ASPECTS JURIDIQUES DU CAPITALISME MODERNE 87-104 (1st
ed. 1946). In particular, see RIPERT, id., at 102 (“pendent toute la vie sociale,
l’actionnaire se présente comme créancier de la société”). Interestingly, in spite of
occasional references to German law, Ripert does not refer to American or German
writers with similar ideas. For a summary of Ripert’s theory see Thierry Kirat, The
firm between law and economics, in THE FIRM AS AN ENTITY 131, 138-141 (Yuri
Biondi, Arnaldo Canziani & Thierry Kirat eds. 2007). Kirat, however, does not
discuss Ripert’s ideas about employment.
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See Kirat, id., at 141.
300
RIPERT, id., at 270.
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An increasing number of scholars emphasized the “institutional character” of the company during subsequent decades, and, in
doing so, focused on majority-minority conflicts.302 Despax argued in
1957 that the “enterprise” had a separate interest from that of the entrepreneur,303 and that it was developing more and more autonomy in
the law. Effectively, it was on the way to having legal capacity on its
own;304 he also suggested that it was necessary to balance the interests of capital, labor, and costumers within the enterprise.305 As in
Germany, the discussion of this period was partly linked to an increasingly sociological understanding of the nature of the “enterprise”
that was more than just a form of business organization.
The heyday of the institutional school came during the 1960s.
Members of the “School of Rennes” argued that the “enterprise”
served as a focal point for economic activity, economic assets, and
entrepreneurial decision-making, for which the corporation provided
the organizational structure.306 The School of Rennes was later described by one of its main representatives, Claude Champaud, as a
“realist” movement.307 His 1962 book explored the concentration of
302

E.g. Jean Portemer, Du contrat à l’institution, 1947 SEMAINE JURIDIQUE JCP,
doctrine, para. 586 (suggesting that an understanding of managers as agents of
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DESPAX, id. para. 290.
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L’ENTREPRISE 5 (1967); see Jean Paillusseau, Le droit des activités économiques à
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corporations, focusing on legal instruments used to achieve concentration and to create corporate groups, and on the legal consequences.
Other than American scholars such as Berle, to whom he sometimes
referred in his work, he did not focus on the managerial power of
large corporations, but developed a distinction between shareholders
purely contributing funds and those taking a larger share, intending to
exercise control over the firm.308 Quite obviously, this raised much
less concern about the protection of shareholders against management, but rather the protection of non-controlling shareholder and
creditors.309 “Business activity”, he argued, “in large corporations is
profoundly marked by the dominance of controlling shareholders,”310
which of course raises the problem of abuse.311
Champaud seems not to have been particularly concerned with
stakeholders or an institutional understanding of the firm. However,
the emphasis on the two types of shareholders was picked up a few
years later by Jean Paillusseau, who developed the legal theory of the
intérêt social. He argued that the traditional contractual understanding
of the corporation was not capable of explaining the increasing power
of managers in large firms and the decline of the practical importance
of shareholder meetings.312 His descriptive account is similar to that
of the American authors of this period. Again, the crucial difference
to the US that characterized his theory related to concentrated ownership.313 The reason for the decline of the shareholder meeting was
therefore, in his view, not merely the absenteeism of contributors of
capital, but the existence of controlling shareholders who were able to
impose their will on the firm.314 The theory thus seems torn between
the apparent necessity of centralized corporate decision-making and
the role of large blockholders. Apparently assuming that controlling
308
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shareholders were typically represented on the board of directors, he
observed that members of the board of directors were typically in the
position to impose their will on other shareholders; the shareholder
meeting must therefore not be allowed to authorize or approve acts
contrary to the intérêt social.315 For the definition of the concept,
while not explicitly emphasizing stakeholder issues, he picked up
Despax’ theory of the institutional nature of the firm and argued that
the firm’s interest cannot be identified with the interest of shareholders, but that it includes all of the interests converging in the enterprise, the goal essentially residing in the life and growth of the economic organism.316 The interest of the firm was thus intended as a
limit to shareholder power.

5.2.

Institutionalism, the law, and the courts

Institutional theories of the corporation apparently did have
some background in the development of legislation. On the legal level, the concept of intérêt social can be traced to the 1930s, when
France was suffering from the effects of the Great Depression and
political instability. The Laval government had been given the power
to take emergency measures in June 1935 in order to “ensure the defense of the currency and to fight speculation.”317 Among other
things, the government used this power to pass a decree-law in August 1935 without parliamentary approval or debate.318 This law introduced a number of business crimes, including abus de biens sociaux (abuse of corporate assets), which remains in the law319 and
315
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CAROLINE JOLY-BAUMGARTNER, L’ABUS DE BIENS SOCIAUX A L’EPREUVE DE LA
PRATIQUE 8 (2002); Nicole Stolowy, Company-Related Offenses in French Legislation, 2007 J. BUS. L. 1, 3 (2007).
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continues to be important in practice.320 It penalizes directors' misuse
of the company’s property and credit in bad faith, “when directors
knew that it was contrary to its interest.”321 While the provision did
not explicitly use the wording intérêt social,322 the concept was used
to refer to the offense.323 Even early commentators pointed out that
the interest of the company was not identical to that of shareholders,
but that, for example, an actual damage to the corporate patrimony
was required and that a decrease in the stock price did not suffice.324
Attempts to strengthen management vis-à-vis shareholders
may have played a role as well. In fall 1940, only months after the
German invasion, the Vichy government hastily passed a reform of
the structure of the firm’s leadership without a debate or a clarification of its motives,325 which had to be amended in early 1943 due to
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shortcomings in legislative craftsmanship.326 However, there was also
a substantive aspect to this reform, which further increased the concentration of power: In 1940, the president of the board was by default the CEO at the same time, but he was still permitted to designate
another person to take that position. The 1943 reform made the identity of the two functions mandatory,327 introducing the Président Directeur-General (PDG) – CEO and president of the board – as the dominating figure in French corporations.
Until the “nouvelles régulations économiques” reforms of
2001,328 the two functions of president of the board (président) and
CEO (Directeur-General) had to be held by the same person.329 Some
contemporary writers attributed this development to a “transposition
of the German theory of the Führerprinzip” in France.330 After the
end of the German occupation, a growing number of scholars objected to this interpretation of invents and argued out that these
enactments had been intended to identify a clear responsibility within
326
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the firm and were a reaction to prevailing monitoring problems, as the
members of the board (particularly the president) did not take a sufficient interest in what the firm’s mangers did.331 Yves Bouthillier, the
finance minister of the Vichy government, later explained that the
motivation was to appease the working class by showing that the
government took action by linking responsibility to personal liability
of the PDG, while at the same time avoiding the populist option of
state ownership.332 By contrast, a book comparing French and German law published in 1941 (by a former and a future center-left
member of parliament) identified strong German influence on the
enactment and concluded that “understanding German law sheds light
on French legislation and facilitates its comprehension.”333 While all
of these reasons may have jointly motivated the reform, some postwar writers may have felt compelled to distance French legal developments from German influence.334 Given that French law, other than
German law, concentrated power in the hand of one person – the
PDG – one could even argue that the principle was implemented in
purer form west of the Rhine.335
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The law did not revert after World War II. As one author from
that period notes, the reason may have been post-war state involvement in the economy.336 A 1963 textbook points out that the political
authorities took a hostile stance towards large corporations, a many of
which were nationalized during that period. Reforms were characterized by a “spirit of struggle against financial capitalism.”337 The
“hierarchical” view of the firm was subsequently espoused also by the
French Supreme Court (Cour de Cassation) that prohibited the shareholder meeting from interfering with the board’s competences.338
Contemporary observers suggested that the law of 1940 had effectively turned the relationship between the shareholder meeting, directors,
and the PDG on its head.339
As described in the previous subsection, the 1960s are often
thought to be the period when the institutional view of the corporation
finally defeated the contractual view not only in legal theory, but also
in the law. The 1966 reform has been described as endorsing it by
creating a largely mandatory corporate law (the “institution”) that
would protect minorities, creditors, and employees.340 More importantly, the core role of the intérêt social in the case law took root during the 1960s. Besides its role in corporate criminal law already described, there are various contexts in which it comes up. Among other
things, it is used as the standard to which managerial decisions are
held in liability suits, and it is also a component of the abus to majorité (abuse of majority powers) and abus de minorité (abuse of minority
rights) doctrines, which are used to assess the validity of shareholder

der the name of the ‘führer prinzip’ [sic!], that formula of the ‘président-directeur
général’ that the Germans have never known”).
336
See Leblond, supra note 302, at 29 (attributing the maintenance of the reform to
a “post-war statist tendency”).
337
RIPERT & ROBLOT, supra note 331, at 474-475.
338
Cass. civ., 4 juin 1946, 1947 LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE (JCP), II, para. 3518 (“arrêt
Motte”).
339
E.g. D. Bastian, Case note, 1947 LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE (JCP) II, 3518 (describing how different observers, in their interpretation of the law, either sought to expand or to limit its consequences).
340
Jean Paillusseau, La modernisation du droit des sociétés commerciales, 1996
RECUEIL DALLOZ SIREY, chronique, 287, 289.
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resolutions (i.e. resolutions found to violate the intérêt social can be
voided).341
Interestingly, the question of dividends, which had been controversial both in Dodge v. Ford in the US and in the German debates
of the 1920s and 1930s, is sometimes addressed by the abus de majorité doctrine under French law, namely when the majority shareholder
votes to retain earnings. While the power to decide about this issue
has always remained with the shareholder meeting in France, the
courts tend to find against the plaintiff minority, as judges usually
consider the retention of earnings to be in the interest of the firm.342
The intérêt social serves as the standard to which the majority shareholders’ decision is held.
Nevertheless, the leading case that connects the notion of intérêt social to a purported shareholder-stakeholder conflict, Fruehauf343, was decided in 1965 and is as unusual as the sparse US cases on the shareholder primacy norm. Fruehauf-France had entered
into a contract to deliver sixty trucks to a customer who would ultimately have exported them to the People’s Republic of China, which
apparently caused some difficulty for its American majority shareholder at home. The majority voted to cancel the deal, but the minori341

MAURICE COZIAN, ALAIN VIANDIER
CIETES 167 (17th ed. 2004).,For an abuse

& FLORENCE DEBOISSY, DROIT DES SOto found, the courts generally require two
conditions to be met cumulatively, namely (1) that a decision was taken with the
exclusive purpose to favor the majority (and harm the minority), and (2) that this
decision does not respect the intérêt social. See C. cass. 18 avril 1961, 1961 SEMAINE JURIDIQUE (JCP), ED. G., II, para. 12164; Cass. com. 22 avr. 1976, 1976 REVUES DES SOCIETES 479; Cass. com. 30 mai 1980, 1981 REVUE DES SOCIETES 311
(note by Dominique Schmidt); cf. Dominique Schmidt, De l’intérêt commun des
associés, 1994 SEMAINE JURIDIQUE (JCP), EDITION GENERALE, I, 440, 441; Antoine
Pirovano, La “boussole” de la société. Intérêt commun, intérêt social, intérêt
d’entreprise ? 1997 RECUEIL DALLOZ 190, 194; COZIAN ET AL., id, at n. 354; see
also Conac et al., supra note 279, at 501. In other words, when a resolution is found
to conform to the intérêt social, but favors the majority, it is shielded from nullification, which has led to some criticism in recent years. See particularly SCHMIDT, id.,
at 318, 330-331, 339-340.
342
See MERLE & FAUCHON, supra note 291, para. 580; COZIAN ET AL., id., para.
362.
343
CA Paris, 22 mai 1965, JCP 1965, II, para. 14274bis; D. 1968, Jur. p. 147 (note
by Raphaël Contin).
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ty of board members (representing French minority shareholders)
objected and asked the competent local court to appoint a preliminary
administrator for the company. The Paris Court of Appeal confirmed
the lower courts’ decision to that end, stating that the cancellation
would have resulted in the ruin of the company because of the alienation of a major customer, and ultimately in the loss of 650 (French)
jobs. Thus, the decision was found to violate the intérêt social. Even
though the case became well-known344 and is still cited for introducing a new criterion into the evaluation of management decisions, no
others followed.345 Like the American cases, it is easy to argue that
the case represented rather a majority-minority conflict than a shareholder-stakeholder one.346
Despite the significance of the criminal provisions drawing
upon the idea of intérêt social, which are said to be of some relevance
to the protection of creditors, commentators assert that it has not been
all that important with respect to potential conflicts of interest between shareholders and other constituencies. Most of all, the Fruehauf case, in which the court explicitly referred to the dangers to
employees, remained largely without further jurisprudential consequences, as it did e.g. not allow unions to challenge management decisions on behalf of employees.347 The concept has been criticized as
embodying outdated managerial ideas of the 1970s, when the intérêt
social was used as “a curtain of fume behind which managers had
ultimately considered the enterprise their own,” with legal mechanisms being built around the protection of the position of the dominant
stockholder.348 In any case, the function of the standard seems to be
mainly to restrain actions that deliberately harm the corporation,
without being much of a check on business decisions, such as how to

344

Cf. Raphaël Contin, Note, 1968 RECUEIL DALLOZ SIREY 148, 150.
Claude Ducouloux-Favard, Actionnariat et pouvoir, 1995 RECUEIL DALLOZ
SIREY, chronique, 177, 180; Philippe Bissara, L’intérêt social, 117 REVUE DES SOCIETES 5, 15 (1999) (both pointing out that the case remained isolated).
346
See PAILLUSSEAU, supra note 306, at 199 (describing the case); see also Pirovano, supra note 341, at 190 (pointing out the political ramifications of the case).
347
Pirovano, id., at 190.
348
Pirovano, id., at 195.
345
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best finance the company, which supplier to use, or how to organize
the firm.349
The nationalization of many large French firms seems not to
have played a significant role in the institutionalist movement in
French thought about the corporation,350 as authors developing the
theory rarely discuss it.351 Nationalized firms such as Renault were
often directly run as an economic unit of the government and not as
corporations. In other cases, the state was the only shareholder.352
Where minority shareholders remained, their relationship with the
state majority may not have been all too different from that of a minority in a family-owned firm if the government used the firm to advance goals at odds with purely financial shareholder interests. However, managers in public-sector firms are usually thought to have
comparatively large powers to act independently, even from the gov349

Bissara, supra note 345, at 16.
While the Third Republic (up to World War II) was described as anti-labor up to
the rise of the left-wing Popular Front in 1935 (ROE, supra note 9, at 70), the state
began to play a major role in the French economy after World War II. Nationalizations began in 1936/37 with industries crucial for the military and transportation.
See HAMEL & LAGARDE, supra note 323, para. 893. After the war, all firms “with
the character of a public national service or of a natural monopoly” followed, as did
some firms such as Renault whose owner was (possibly falsely) being accused of
collaboration. See HAMEL & LAGARDE, id. para. 894; JEAN-FRANÇOIS ECK, HISth
TOIRE DE L’ECONOMIE FRANÇAISE DEPUIS 1945, 13 (4 ed. 1994). Some firms were
nationalized to aid the government’s planned reconstruction efforts, which succeeded and resulted in “Les Trente Glorieuses”, 30 years of economic growth after
the war. See James A. Fanto, The Transformation of French Corporate Governance
and Institutional Investors, 21 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1, 32 (1995). Much later, the socialist government under President Mitterrand took a number of large firms under
the wing of state ownership in 1981/82. Fanto, id., at 33; Michel Berne & Gérard
Pogorel, Privatization Experiences in France, CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 1195,
1, at http://ssrn.com/abstract=553952 (2003). On nationalization and privatization
during the 1980s see also ECK, id., at 50-51.
351
DESPAX (supra note 303, at 164-169) discusses nationalizations, but focuses on
the legal aspect of nationalizations laws leaving the structure of the “enterprise”
intact.
352
HAMEL & LAGARDE, supra note 323, para. 902, 914. In the économie mixte the
government merely took a majority share, but it was usually made sure that directors were appointed by the state. HAMEL & LAGARDE, id., para. 932; Fanto, supra
note 350, at 34.
350
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ernment,353 which would have put them in the position to advance an
agenda centering on the “interests of the firm”, however defined.

5.3.

Dismissal ad nutum

There is another aspect of French law that may explain why
the “interests of the firm” as a guiding legal standard is less important
than it might seem at first glance. Despite the establishment of the
institutional theory in French corporate law in the 1960s, shareholders
were always in the position to remove directors by a simple majority
vote before their stipulated term of office. Ducouloux-Favard, writing
in 1996, describes this revocation ad nutum as a characteristic of the
contract of agency and a pillar of corporate law that remains indestructible.354 True, the 2001 NRE law355 resulted in some changes to
the relationship between shareholders and managers. Previously,
shareholders could directly remove the Président Directeur-General
(PDG, i.e. CEO) by revoking the appointment to the board of directors, given that he had to be its president.356 Now, shareholders can
now only remove board members,357 while the managing directors are
appointed, and can be removed by the board at any time.358 While the
PDG may traditionally have enjoyed a particularly authoritative position during the day-to-day management of the firm,359 this powerful
position was undermined the majority’s removal power that French

353

JEAN KERNINON, LES CADRES JURIDIQUES DE L’ECONOMIE MIXTE 88-90 (2nd ed.
1994); Fanto, id., at 34-37.
354
Claude Ducouloux-Favard, Les déviances de la gestion dans nos grandes entreprises, 1996 RECUEIL DALLOZ SIREY, chronique, 190, 191. In fact, several early
proponents of the French institutional theory had recognized that the revocation ad
nutum principle was untenable under the contrary position and called for legislative
reform. See GAILLARD, supra note 292, at 120-123; RIPERT, supra note 298, at 119.
355
Supra note 328.
356
GERMAIN, supra note 325, para. 1685.
357
Art. L. 225-18 al. 2 C. com.
358
Art. L. 225-55 C. com. These rules are considered mandatory law. See MERLE &
FAUCHON, supra note 291, para. 386; GERMAIN, supra note 325, para. 1653.
359
E.g. Alcouffe, supra note 291, at 129 (2000). On the transplantation of the Nazi
Führerprinzip to France, see supra note 328-335 and accompanying text.
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law always retained.360 The reform may in fact have slightly strengthened the position of managers by providing that premature removal
from office may give rise to damages under certain circumstances.

5.4. Conclusion: Another attempt to constrain shareholders through institutionalism
French corporate law shares an influential institutionalist current with German law. The development began in the 1930s and came
to full fruition in the 1960s. French law shared many aspects of its
historical development with German law, such as a period of volatility of ownership structures between the wars, and an ensuing debate
focusing on the institutional nature of the firm. As in Germany, it was
intended as a legal standard that would serve to defend the firm
against individual interests of shareholders, an issue that was of little
significance in the US. Again, the historical overview illustrates how
the economic background variable of ownership structure influenced
the debate.

6.

Emerging comparative patterns

On the basis of these country-specific histories, we can identify some cross-country patterns. Section 6.1 summarizes the results of
the US, German and French debates and puts them into comparative
perspective. Section 6.2 further develops the main theory of this article, namely how pro-shareholder and pro-stakeholder (or institutional) arguments were employed to reach different ends in dispersed and
concentrated ownership systems. Section 6.3 asks whether the historical debates had an influence on more recent developments. I suggest
that there has been a change since the 1980s, to which a growing disillusionment with the actual effects of institutional theories may have
contributed.
360

See GERMAIN, supra note 325, at 453; Ducouloux-Favard, supra note 354, at
191 (describing the possibility of removal at nutum as being at odds with the prevailing institutional theory of the firm); Enriques et al., supra note 156, at 61 (noting the non-waivable right in French law to remove directors midterm).
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A transnational history of the debate

The ultimate trigger of the debate was the development of the
“great corporation”, characterized by a large capital basis, specialized
management, and an increased detachment from its owners. Rathenau
was among the first to recognize this when he spoke of the “substitution of the reason” (Substitution des Grundes) for the existence and
role of corporations in 1917.361 He argued that the “enterprise” was
essentially turning into an institution resembling the state,362 a passage that was later cited by Berle and Means.363 With his involvement
in the New Deal, Berle similarly began to sympathize at least to some
degree with a “public” function of corporations and directors, although he thought that the shareholder primacy norm was necessary
to curb managerial power. Rathenau pointed out that the development
of large firms was already more advanced in the US and in Germany
than in other countries including the UK and France, which may explain why these countries were the first to develop a debate.364
The rise of the large firm was a phenomenon common to the
US and Germany, but apart from that point, the debates diverged between the two countries. Rathenau’s position seems to have been characterized by his personal experience on the board of what we would
today call a Berle-Means firm, while most German firms had controlling shareholders, an issue that was picked up by subsequent legal
commentators. Concentrated ownership may in fact have increased
after World War I due to inflation (as it did in France in the late
1920s). Berle and Means, on the other hand, identified a prevailing
pattern of powerful management and dispersed shareholders that had
already solidified. The distinction characterized the respective national debates: In the US, scholars were concerned by the quasi-political,
361

See RATHENAU, supra note 166, at 8.
RATHENAU, supra note 179, VON KOMMENDEN DINGEN, at 143; RATHENAU,
supra note 179, IN DAYS TO COME, at 121.
363
BERLE & MEANS, supra note 7, at 352.
364
RATHENAU, supra note 166, at 10. In the UK, the debate arose primarily during
the 1970s, when the introduction of a mandatory employee participation system
similar to the German model was discussed. See BULLOCK, supra note 262: Marsh
& Locksley, supra note 262, at 49-50 (discussing the failure of the proposal).
362
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agency-cost driving power of managers, while in Germany, legal
scholars picking up Rathenau’s ideas were concerned with the position of large shareholders in corporations, and with their interference
with the proper functioning of management.
Mark Roe persuasively argued that American politics was historically often turned against the power of large financial institutions,
which kept them small and unable to become major shareholders like
their European peers. Economic crises and corporate governance
scandals led to the New Deal reforms, which helped to further enshrine dispersed ownership.365 By the time of the economic crisis of the
1930s, this structure was firmly entrenched (at least in the mind of the
public debate shaped by Berle and Means). The political response
was the New Deal, specifically the 1933 Securities Act and the 1934
Securities Exchange Act, which partly addressed the concern about
excessive power of managers by providing extensive disclosure. Most
stakeholder concerns that might have arisen were overshadowed by
the fact that the enshrinement of managerial power ensured the protection of legal capacity from shareholder influence and thus protected stakeholders’ expectations, while it exacerbated agency problems in the shareholder-manager relationship. In the following decades, scholars observed the power of managers and debated whether
and how to constrain it, and whether political and regulatory intervention was necessary to ensure that firms directed their minds towards
the public policy concerns that their powerful position entailed.
In Germany, managers were not seen as sufficiently insulated
from the possibilities of blockholders to interfere. The 1937 corporate
law reform, in spite of many ideological overtones, was ultimately
pragmatic, as even hardened ideologues had to realize that large firms
could not operate without tapping capital markets. The reform intended to shield managers from shareholder influence and enshrined a
corporate objective norm that went well beyond shareholder interests.
Still, in spirit it was skeptical towards capital, and it was intended to
foster managerial power. Concerns were raised not by the power of
managers, but primarily by the power of capital, both to the proper

365

ROE, supra note 10, at 51-123.
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functioning of firms and the public interest.366 The attempt to contain
it may have been a logical reaction. Blockholders persisted and continued to exert a strong influence on large German firms, which prohibited the rise of a truly strong management.
True, as in the US, there often was popular sentiment against
big business in these countries; however, it was never directed directly against large blockholders, whose role was already entrenched.367
With structures of corporate control firmly in place, the reforms
helped to solidify an institutional view of the firm that intended centralize power within the firm and to reduce the role of shareholders –
quite the opposite from what was debated in the US. Codetermination, in particular its enhancement in 1976, was another reaction to
capital against the background of raising political power of labor.368
At the same time, it strengthened the institutional view of the firm,
which, however, remained overshadowed by concentrated ownership.
Until the 1990s, when the importance of capital markets began to rise
again, this view remained mostly unopposed.
The French debate resembled the German one. French populism in the 1930s was directed against powerful families.369 Like their
Eastern neighbors, French firms saw entrenchment through shares
carrying a disproportional number of votes (which were prohibited in
France in 1931/1934 and in Germany in 1937). However, only after
World War II and a period of nationalization, French institutionalist
theory solidified in the 1960s, with the intérêt social intended as a
366

See FRIEDRICH KLAUSING, GESETZ ÜBER DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN UND
KOMMANDITGESELLSCHAFTEN AUF AKTIEN 56 (1937) (official report accompanying
the 1937 act stating that “fundamental decisions regarding the fate of the corporation are made by the majority of the providers of funds, who are personally not
responsible, who usually lack precise and competent insight into business and the
firm’s operations, and who typically emphasize the concerns of capital.”)
367
See ROE, supra note 10, at 212-216 (describing German “populism” and the role
of banks).
368
Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and
the United States, in 102 YALE L. J. 1927, 1970 (1993).
369
Antoin E. Murphy, Corporate Ownership in France, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD 185, 188 (Randall K. Morck ed. 2005)
(referring to prime minister Edouard Daladier’s famous criticism of the alleged two
hundred “grandes familles” in 1930).
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benchmark to resolve conflicts among shareholders. The debate was
initially hardly characterized by shareholder-stakeholder conflicts; by
contrast, adherents of the institutional school of corporate law were
preoccupied with the protection of the firm from influence by shareholders, which were seen as a danger to a prosperous development.
As in Germany, the increased need to tap capital markets made the
pendulum swing back in the other direction in the 1990s.

6.2.

Defending the firm against its shareholders

Why was institutionalism brought forward as an answer to interference of shareholders with management or from strife between
shareholders groups? As explained above in section 2.3, economic
analysis has brought forward reasons why it may be beneficial to set
limits to shareholder control. Many of the arguments resonate with
the historical debate: Tight monitoring may stifle managerial initiative.370 Discord among shareholders, particularly when they are heterogeneous, may hamper decision-making,371 which is a more significant issue in a firm with various blockholders than in an “atomistic”
structure where each shareholder will most likely be primarily interest
in making a return on his or her investment. Controlling shareholders
or coalitions of large shareholders may abuse their strong position in
the firm to obtain private benefits, to the detriment of the minority
and other stakeholders.372 Last but not least, to those who sought to
make corporations subservient to public policy goals, financially motivated decision-making by shareholders was obviously an anathema.
Table 1 summarizes the argument: Shareholder influence may
increase the agency cost of debt, as managers are more likely to engage in risk enhancement:373 The going-concern value of the firm is
370

Mike Burkart, Denis Gromb & Fausto Panunzi, Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm, 112 Q. J. ECON. 693 (1997).
371
Bainbridge, Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note 62, at 1744-1751; Anabtawi, supra note 64, at 577-593.
372
E.g. Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 153, at 754-755; Armour et al., supra note
153, at 36.
373
See Hollis Ashbaugh-Skaife, Daniel W. Collins & Ryan B. LaFond, The effects
of corporate governance on firms‘ credit ratings, 42 J. ACCT. & ECON. 203 (2006)
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more strongly protected if it is harder for shareholders to force the
disgorgement of funds.374 Shielding corporations from shareholders
allows long-term commitment of capital to the firm, which in turn
may allow stakeholders to commit to their relationship due to lower
risks for their specific investment.375
Ownership
structure

Effective
controller of
the firm

Main problem(s)

Dispersed
ownership

Directors
and officers

x Managerial
agency cost

Concentrated
ownership

Controlling
shareholder
or coalition

x Controller’s
private benefits
x disruptive
conflict between
shareholders
x holdup of
stakeholders

“Reformist”
response in
historical
debates
shareholder
primacy

institutional
theory of the
firm / stakeholders

Defense of
the status
quo
institutional
theory of the
firm / stakeholders
shareholder
primacy

Table 1

In a dispersed ownership setting, managerial agency problems
and the strong position of management in general were considered to
be the main problem. The “reformist” position was therefore to constrain managers tightly, for which a shareholder primacy position
seemed to offer the best option. An institutional or stakeholder theory
focusing on the board of directors was typically a defense for incum(finding a correlation between block ownership and higher cost of debt, and a negative one for takeover defenses); on the debate in finance see also Roman Inderst &
Holger Müller, Ownership Concentration, Monitoring, and the Agency Cost of
Debt, WORKING PAPER (1999), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=190497; Michael Bradley, Dong Chen, George Dallas & Elisabeth Snyderwine, The Relation between
Corporate Governance and Credit Risk, Bond Yields and Firm Valuation, WORKING PAPER (2007), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1078463.
374
See Hansmann et al., supra note 74, at 1348-1350 (discussing the protection of
the going concern value from liquidation).
375
Blair, supra note 78.
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bent managers. In a concentrated ownership system, disruptive influence of shareholders on the firm becomes a major problem, either
because of a controlling shareholder, or because of disputes between
shareholders. Thus, an institutional theory that reduced shareholder
control seemed appealing as a way of shutting out the power of capital and as a guideline for the resolution of conflicts. For several decades, the “reformist” position was therefore the one asserting the independence of the firm. The point of my argument is not that the managerial agency problem is unimportant in general, or in concentrated
ownership systems specifically. I rather emphasize that the problems
of shareholder decision-making power brought forward in the contemporary debate increase when a firm’s ownership structure does not
resemble an atomistic Berle-Means structure, where everybody has
merely a small financial interest, but when there are larger blocks,
where the interests of blockholders, controlling or not, are heterogeneous. Against the backdrop of concentrated ownership structures,
institutional theories were therefore more appealing.

6.3.

Does the theory predict more recent developments

Do these patterns persist, and do they help us to explain contemporary developments in corporate governance? Is there still a controversy between supporters of strong management and those of
shareholders in the US, while in Europe advocates of institutional
theories seek to expand the “independent” position of shareholders to
the disadvantage of blockholders?
For the US, the question is easily answered affirmatively.
Since the takeover wave of the 1980s, the debate has most often
emerged in the context of hostile takeovers. Such an event results in
the replacement of the typical Berle-Means ownership structure by
one dominated by a core shareholder determined to reshape business
activities or even to break up the firm. The takeover wave of the
1980s led to a backlash of law that is (at least superficially) prostakeholder. In 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court famously established a two-prong test for antitakeover measures in Unocal.376 First,
376

Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
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the board has to identify a threat, and second, its response must be
reasonable in relation to the threat posed. Regarding the evaluation of
the existence of a threat by the target board, the court explained that a
number of elements were to be considered when evaluating a possible
threat, such as
“inadequacy of the price offered, nature and
timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact
on "constituencies" other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the
community generally), the risk of nonconsummation,
and the quality of securities being offered in the exchange” (emphasis added).377
When it further specified the standard in subsequent opinions,
at least during the 1980s, the Delaware Supreme Court maintained its
view that the interests of other constituencies are to be considered as
objects of a threat which the board may resist.378 The Unitrin decision
of 1995379 further increased the latitude of the board by finding that
defensive measures will only be prohibited if the court finds them to
be draconian, i.e. “coercive” or “preclusive”. Similarly, in more than
half of all states,380 a statute explicitly allows or requires directors to
take the interests of other constituencies into account, with Delaware
and California being the most prominent absentees. Groups mentioned apart from shareholders are employees, creditors, bondholders,

377

493 A.2d 955.
Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 , 1342
(1987); Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 68
(1989); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153
(1989)
379
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380
Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes and High
Fears, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85, 125-128 (listing a total of 32 statutes, among
those 30 constituency statutes and 2 statutes explicitly allowing to consider the
directors to consider the corporation’s continued independence as optimally serving
the corporation’s and shareholder interest). However, Nebraska’s statute was repealed in 1995. Springer, id., at 95.
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suppliers and communities; some statutes mention broader societal
interest381 or even officers of the corporation.382
The rhetoric employed by the Delaware courts, as well as
some of these statutes, is often built on an institutional understanding
of the corporation. Before enumerating the relevant constituencies in
the quoted passage above, the court requires directors to identify the
“threat posed” by the takeover bid to the “corporate enterprise.”383 In
doing so, the argument is that the court may reasonably consider the
interests of shareholders, including “short term speculators, whose
actions may have fueled the coercive aspect of the offer at the expense of the long term investor.”384 This language seems to indicate
that the Unocal court considered the entity aspect to be worth of protection, and that it views it as an amalgamate of the interests of various groups. Very much in line with a typically American understanding of corporate law, the board of directors is given a broad latitude in
defining how exactly these interests are to be weighed. It is particularly revealing that, according to the Delaware Supreme Court, Revlon
duties apply when a corporation initiates a bidding process “to sell
itself”.385 It would be hard to find such language in Continental European parlance, since logically only the corporation’s owners would be
in the position to sell it.
The Unocal court was also concerned about conflicts of interest between long-term and short-term shareholders,386 as were Continental European proponents of institutional theories of corporate
law.387 While Delaware leaves it to directors to resolve these conflicts
by identifying a threat to the “corporate enterprise”, the European
scholars looked to the “institutional interest” as a judicial guideline,
381
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which again underscores the different functions of the “institutional”
argument.
In the two European countries, it appears that institutionalism
seems to be losing the important role it once had. A growing number
of legal writers now argue in favor of shareholder primacy.388 One
explanatory factor could be the internationalization of the debate in
the wake of ECJ case law389 permitting regulatory competition,390 and
other forces of convergence. Policy debates are now often dominated
by the goal of attracting international investment. Consequently,
agency cost analysis has gained significance. A parallel development
was the propagation of UK-inspired “codes of good corporate governance”, which addressed the grievances of institutional investors and
swept the Continent in the late 1990s and early 2000s.391
Despite changes in some Continental corporate governance
practices (such as the cautious withdrawal of German banks from
extensive share ownership in industrial firms392), concentrated ownership structures have largely remained in place so far. Nevertheless,
388

For Germany, see supra notes 263-265 and accompanying text. For France, see
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some observers have identified a shift from “institutional” theories of
the corporation to contractarianism in Germany.393 In France, criticism against institutional theories of the corporation began to mount
in the 1990s as well.394 Protection of individual shareholders increased in the past twenty years in several important jurisdictions,
including Germany and France.395 The UK model of requiring a mandatory bid when a single shareholder acquires a controlling stake,
which is arguably intended to protect small shareholders against large
ones, was implemented throughout Europe through the Takeover Directive.396
What are the reasons for this shift? Is it merely a change
against controlling shareholders, resulting in a departure from institutional theories to minority shareholders’ rights? The growing appeal
of the American model may have played a role. Another factor could
have been a growing disillusionment with institutional theories. German and French commentators have both increasingly criticized institutional objectives to be too malleable, too unclear be workable for
courts in practice, who are likely to accept a definition of the corporate interest suiting insiders.397 While there is no clear pattern in the
outcomes of the court decisions discussed in this paper, legal standards such as shareholder primacy, Unternehmensinteresse or intérêt
social leave a lot of space for interpretation and argument. Since both
managers and controlling shareholders are in a good position to make
393
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395
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397
For Germany, see Spindler, supra note 216, comment 70 (diagnosing a disillusionment about the usefulness of the concept of Unternehmensinteresse among
legal scholars); for France, see Schmidt, supra note 388; SCHMIDT, supra note 388
(both criticizing the intérêt social as allowing too much discretion to controlling
shareholders).
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a good case to the court, the actual constraints for these groups is very
small, if there is any.
In shareholder-employee conflicts of interests, there were certainly more important regulatory incursions that limited shareholder
power, most of all codetermination in Germany, and stronger employment protection laws in Western Europe compared to the US.398
These differences may also help to explain why shareholder primacy
typically had the greater appeal in the US, whereas institutional theories have more often appealed to Continental European scholars. Institutional theories of corporate law seem to precipitate rather than
follow the full development of pro-labor laws.399 It remains to be seen
whether the current American trend towards shareholder empowerment, which seems to be the consequence of increased significance of
institutional shareholders, will lead to a backlash of stakeholderoriented thought. It is conceivable that the debate lost its vigor since
there was less at stake with pro-stakeholder laws in place that gave
them specific rights and were therefore actually enforceable. As
Christopher Bruner points out in the context of the UK, the growth
the welfare state may also have reduced employees’ need for protection.400 Today employees – the stakeholder group probably least capable of contractual self-protection – certainly have less need for protection than at the time when institutional theories arose. Fewer distributive gains may be available between employees and shareholders
than in the past. It may therefore become easier to argue in favor of
the protection of minority shareholders without interfering with
stakeholder issues too much.

398
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Conclusion

This article took a “grand tour” through the history of the debates about the goal of corporate law and objective of directors in the
US, Germany and France. We have traced shareholder-stakeholder
debates through history and the particular political circumstances in
which corporate law developed. The roots of the debates in all three
countries go back to the interwar period, with the German one beginning the earliest, followed closely by the US. The French debate has
its roots in the 1930s as well, but reached its peak only during the
1960s.
While political and cultural factors have certainly played a
role for the attractiveness of institutional and stakeholder theories in
the two Continental European countries, I have attempted to show
that differences in the underlying economic structure have at least
contributed to divergences in their reception. Both shareholder primacy and stakeholder arguments were intended to serve different goals
in the debates of these countries, depending on prevailing (or perceived) corporate ownership structures and distribution of power between management and shareholders.
In the dispersed ownership system of the US, the main concern was and is the unconstrained power of managers. In debates revolving around large American firms they largely served the managerial status quo. Shareholder primacy arguments tended to be
brought forward in order to keep corporations and managers in check,
while stakeholder arguments served as a managerial defense. By contrast, in France and Germany there was less need to tame Continental
“giant corporations” and their managers, but rather a concern that
firms needed protection from their shareholders, whose influence was
considered detrimental by some early analysts of corporate governance. Institutional theories – coupled with stakeholder arguments or
not – were intended to assert an independent position of the firm, and
thus as an instrument to protect the most important economic vehicles
of economic activity against capital. In practice, this project seems to
have largely failed. Growing disillusionment with stakeholder theories – at least on the level of directors’ duties – and the increasing
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attractiveness of the American model during the 1990s began to undermine the role of stakeholder theories and became a force of convergence in corporate governance. The future will show whether the
current financial crisis will turn the tide.
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